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Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1370: Corrected some typos
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b6b9834 small fixes (Alejandro)

Pull request description:

  Corrected some typos

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    ACK b6b9834

Tree-SHA512: c40c22c66f1067ecca351f08cca07a78b00bb98af2f6cfb08c25d0b1db6845e0e32ace1954c386db7020cf9fc7ae973ff15bd6d9c0144f3d21ea28c15741050f
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real-or-random committed Jul 3, 2023
2 parents 3fc1de5 + b6b9834 commit 0aacf64
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Showing 6 changed files with 7 additions and 7 deletions.
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion examples/examples_util.h
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Expand Up @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void secure_erase(void *ptr, size_t len) {
* As best as we can tell, this is sufficient to break any optimisations that
* might try to eliminate "superfluous" memsets.
* This method used in memzero_explicit() the Linux kernel, too. Its advantage is that it is
* pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficently,
* pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficiently,
* just not remove it entirely. See "Dead Store Elimination (Still) Considered Harmful" by
* Yang et al. (USENIX Security 2017) for more background.
*/
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion include/secp256k1_ellswift.h
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Expand Up @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ellswift_create(
/** Given a private key, and ElligatorSwift public keys sent in both directions,
* compute a shared secret using x-only Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).
*
* Returns: 1: shared secret was succesfully computed
* Returns: 1: shared secret was successfully computed
* 0: secret was invalid or hashfp returned 0
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object.
* Out: output: pointer to an array to be filled by hashfp.
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion sage/group_prover.sage
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Expand Up @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ def normalize_factor(p):
(8) * (-bx + ax)^3
```
"""
# Assert p is not 0 and that its non-zero coeffients are coprime.
# Assert p is not 0 and that its non-zero coefficients are coprime.
# (We could just work with the primitive part p/p.content() but we want to be
# aware if factor() does not return a primitive part in future sage versions.)
assert p.content() == 1
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion src/ecmult.h
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Expand Up @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
# pragma message DEBUG_CONFIG_DEF(ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE)
#endif

/* Noone will ever need more than a window size of 24. The code might
/* No one will ever need more than a window size of 24. The code might
* be correct for larger values of ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE but this is not
* tested.
*
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion src/ecmult_const_impl.h
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Expand Up @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_const_xonly(secp256k1_fe* r, const secp256k1_fe *n,
*
* It is easy to verify that both (n*g, g^2, v) and its negation (n*g, -g^2, v) have affine X
* coordinate n/d, and this holds even when the square root function doesn't have a
* determinstic sign. We choose the (n*g, g^2, v) version.
* deterministic sign. We choose the (n*g, g^2, v) version.
*
* Now switch to the effective affine curve using phi_v, where the input point has coordinates
* (n*g, g^2). Compute (X, Y, Z) = q * (n*g, g^2) there.
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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions src/field.h
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Expand Up @@ -192,14 +192,14 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b);

/** Set a field element equal to a provided 32-byte big endian value, reducing it.
*
* On input, r does not need to be initalized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array.
* On input, r does not need to be initialized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array.
* On output, r = a (mod p). It will have magnitude 1, and not be normalized.
*/
static void secp256k1_fe_set_b32_mod(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a);

/** Set a field element equal to a provided 32-byte big endian value, checking for overflow.
*
* On input, r does not need to be initalized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array.
* On input, r does not need to be initialized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array.
* On output, r = a if (a < p), it will be normalized with magnitude 1, and 1 is returned.
* If a >= p, 0 is returned, and r will be made invalid (and must not be used without overwriting).
*/
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