From c6b608abca9c1d525f2c56ed5d6e82ff5994786a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: yangkeunyun <93965275+yangkeunyun@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 10 May 2024 07:39:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Update 1.md

---
 content/papers/1.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/content/papers/1.md b/content/papers/1.md
index 094cc39..1a67d7c 100644
--- a/content/papers/1.md
+++ b/content/papers/1.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ summary: "This paper investigates the optimal allocation of common-pool resource
 
 ##### Abstract
 
-Rising competition in the commons poses risks of resource depletion and congestion, yet it can lower markups and increase consumer welfare. Conversely, larger, longer-lived firms tend to internalize externalities but also limit production and raise prices. To balance these competing concerns, this paper develops a model of common-pool industry dynamics and applies it to the 19th-century American whaling industry. The findings suggest that the industry over-harvested whales in the early periods, leading to inefficient production later on. A monopoly firm partially mitigates these inefficiencies, but it would reduce harvesting more than a social planner who maximizes social welfare. The optimal Pigouvian tax that fully internalizes the shadow values of whaling can achieve a socially efficient allocation.
+Rising competition in the commons poses risks of resource depletion and congestion, yet it can lower markups and increase consumer welfare. Conversely, larger, longer-lived firms tend to internalize externalities but also reduce production and raise prices. To balance these competing concerns, this paper develops a model of common-pool industry dynamics and applies it to the 19th-century American whaling industry. The findings suggest that the industry over-harvested whales in the early periods, leading to inefficient production later on. A monopoly could have partially mitigated these inefficiencies, but it would have reduced harvesting more than a social planner would. The optimal Pigouvian tax that fully internalizes the shadow values of whaling could have achieved a socially efficient allocation.
 
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