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Update odroidu2_defconfig #39

Merged
merged 1 commit into from
Feb 27, 2014
Merged

Update odroidu2_defconfig #39

merged 1 commit into from
Feb 27, 2014

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Reichl
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@Reichl Reichl commented Feb 27, 2014

Unset CONFIG_SERIAL_8250

  • No 8250 on boards
  • Avoids misleading creation of /dev/ttyS1-4 that don't work anyway.

Unset CONFIG_SERIAL_8250
- No 8250 on boards
- Avoids misleading creation of /dev/ttyS1-4 that don't work anyway.
mdrjr added a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 27, 2014
@mdrjr mdrjr merged commit 93ca552 into hardkernel:odroid-3.8.y Feb 27, 2014
@Reichl Reichl deleted the odroid-3.8.y branch January 21, 2015 11:42
@Reichl Reichl restored the odroid-3.8.y branch January 21, 2015 11:42
@Reichl Reichl deleted the odroid-3.8.y branch January 21, 2015 13:39
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 17, 2015
commit 903124f upstream.

memset() to 0 interfaces array before reusing
usb_configuration structure.

This commit fix bug:

ln -s functions/acm.1 configs/c.1
ln -s functions/acm.2 configs/c.1
ln -s functions/acm.3 configs/c.1
echo "UDC name" > UDC
echo "" > UDC
rm configs/c.1/acm.*
rmdir functions/*
mkdir functions/ecm.usb0
ln -s functions/ecm.usb0 configs/c.1
echo "UDC name" > UDC

[   82.220969] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
[   82.229009] pgd = c0004000
[   82.231698] [00000000] *pgd=00000000
[   82.235260] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[   82.240638] Modules linked in:
[   82.243681] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.0.0-rc2 #39
[   82.249926] Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[   82.256003] task: c07cd2f0 ti: c07c8000 task.ti: c07c8000
[   82.261393] PC is at composite_setup+0xe3c/0x1674
[   82.266073] LR is at composite_setup+0xf20/0x1674
[   82.270760] pc : [<c03510d4>]    lr : [<c03511b8>]    psr: 600001d3
[   82.270760] sp : c07c9df0  ip : c0806448  fp : ed8c9c9c
[   82.282216] r10: 00000001  r9 : 00000000  r8 : edaae918
[   82.287425] r7 : ed551cc0  r6 : 00007fff  r5 : 00000000  r4 : ed799634
[   82.293934] r3 : 00000003  r2 : 00010002  r1 : edaae918  r0 : 0000002e
[   82.300446] Flags: nZCv  IRQs off  FIQs off  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment kernel
[   82.307910] Control: 10c5387d  Table: 6bc1804a  DAC: 00000015
[   82.313638] Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0xc07c8210)
[   82.319627] Stack: (0xc07c9df0 to 0xc07ca000)
[   82.323969] 9de0:                                     00000000 c06e65f4 00000000 c07c9f68
[   82.332130] 9e00: 00000067 c07c59ac 000003f7 edaae918 ed8c9c98 ed799690 eca2f140 200001d3
[   82.340289] 9e20: ee79a2d8 c07c9e88 c07c5304 ffff55db 00010002 edaae810 edaae860 eda96d50
[   82.348448] 9e40: 00000009 ee264510 00000007 c07ca444 edaae860 c0340890 c0827a40 ffff55e0
[   82.356607] 9e60: c0827a40 eda96e40 ee264510 edaae810 00000000 edaae860 00000007 c07ca444
[   82.364766] 9e80: edaae860 c0354170 c03407dc c033db4c edaae810 00000000 00000000 00000010
[   82.372925] 9ea0: 00000032 c0341670 00000000 00000000 00000001 eda96e00 00000000 00000000
[   82.381084] 9ec0: 00000000 00000032 c0803a23 ee1aa840 00000001 c005d54c 249e2450 00000000
[   82.389244] 9ee0: 200001d3 ee1aa840 ee1aa8a0 ed84f4c0 00000000 c07c9f68 00000067 c07c59ac
[   82.397403] 9f00: 00000000 c005d688 ee1aa840 ee1aa8a0 c07db4b4 c006009c 00000032 00000000
[   82.405562] 9f20: 00000001 c005ce20 c07c59ac c005cf34 f002000c c07ca780 c07c9f68 00000057
[   82.413722] 9f40: f0020000 413fc090 00000001 c00086b4 c000f804 60000053 ffffffff c07c9f9c
[   82.421880] 9f60: c0803a20 c0011fc0 00000000 00000000 c07c9fb8 c001bee0 c07ca4f0 c057004c
[   82.430040] 9f80: c07ca4fc c0803a20 c0803a20 413fc090 00000001 00000000 01000000 c07c9fb0
[   82.438199] 9fa0: c000f800 c000f804 60000053 ffffffff 00000000 c0050e70 c0803bc0 c0783bd8
[   82.446358] 9fc0: ffffffff ffffffff c0783664 00000000 00000000 c07b13e8 00000000 c0803e54
[   82.454517] 9fe0: c07ca480 c07b13e4 c07ce40c 4000406a 00000000 40008074 00000000 00000000
[   82.462689] [<c03510d4>] (composite_setup) from [<c0340890>] (s3c_hsotg_complete_setup+0xb4/0x418)
[   82.471626] [<c0340890>] (s3c_hsotg_complete_setup) from [<c0354170>] (usb_gadget_giveback_request+0xc/0x10)
[   82.481429] [<c0354170>] (usb_gadget_giveback_request) from [<c033db4c>] (s3c_hsotg_complete_request+0xcc/0x12c)
[   82.491583] [<c033db4c>] (s3c_hsotg_complete_request) from [<c0341670>] (s3c_hsotg_irq+0x4fc/0x558)
[   82.500614] [<c0341670>] (s3c_hsotg_irq) from [<c005d54c>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x50/0x150)
[   82.509291] [<c005d54c>] (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c005d688>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c)
[   82.518145] [<c005d688>] (handle_irq_event) from [<c006009c>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0xd4/0x18c)
[   82.526650] [<c006009c>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c005ce20>] (generic_handle_irq+0x20/0x30)
[   82.535242] [<c005ce20>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c005cf34>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xdc)
[   82.543923] [<c005cf34>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c00086b4>] (gic_handle_irq+0x2c/0x6c)
[   82.552256] [<c00086b4>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0011fc0>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x74)
[   82.559716] Exception stack(0xc07c9f68 to 0xc07c9fb0)
[   82.564753] 9f60:                   00000000 00000000 c07c9fb8 c001bee0 c07ca4f0 c057004c
[   82.572913] 9f80: c07ca4fc c0803a20 c0803a20 413fc090 00000001 00000000 01000000 c07c9fb0
[   82.581069] 9fa0: c000f800 c000f804 60000053 ffffffff
[   82.586113] [<c0011fc0>] (__irq_svc) from [<c000f804>] (arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c)
[   82.593491] [<c000f804>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<c0050e70>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x128/0x1a4)
[   82.601740] [<c0050e70>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0783bd8>] (start_kernel+0x350/0x3bc)
[   82.609890] Code: 0a000002 e3530005 05975010 15975008 (e5953000)
[   82.615965] ---[ end trace f57d5f599a5f1bfa ]---

Most of kernel code assume that interface array in
struct usb_configuration is NULL terminated.

When gadget is composed with configfs configuration
structure may be reused for different functions set.

This bug happens because purge_configs_funcs() sets
only next_interface_id to 0. Interface array still
contains pointers to already freed interfaces. If in
second try we add less interfaces than earlier we
may access unallocated memory when trying to get
interface descriptors.

Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Opasiak <k.opasiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paralin pushed a commit to paralin/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 14, 2015
Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the
following backtrace:

PID: 18308  TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "rsync"
  #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152
  hardkernel#1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e
  hardkernel#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5
  hardkernel#3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a
  hardkernel#4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6
  hardkernel#5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5
  hardkernel#6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f
  hardkernel#7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445
  hardkernel#8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845
  hardkernel#9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead
 hardkernel#10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3
 hardkernel#11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff
 hardkernel#12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f
 hardkernel#13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be
 hardkernel#14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423
 hardkernel#15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5
 hardkernel#16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d
 hardkernel#17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618
 hardkernel#18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b
 hardkernel#19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297
 hardkernel#20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6
 hardkernel#21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1
 hardkernel#22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c
 hardkernel#23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8
 hardkernel#24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09
 hardkernel#25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848
 hardkernel#26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7
 hardkernel#27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa
 hardkernel#28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b
 hardkernel#29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5
 hardkernel#30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490
 hardkernel#31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199
 hardkernel#32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c
 hardkernel#33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1
 hardkernel#34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91
 hardkernel#35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32
 hardkernel#36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5
 hardkernel#37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc
 hardkernel#38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e
 hardkernel#39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e
 hardkernel#40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89

Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the
reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by
PG_writeback right away.

The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM
with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs
was specified.  The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg:
further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the
__GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs
code.  But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't
necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away.

ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily
submit the bio.  Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and
mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up
waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted
yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes.

Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2)
before we go to wait on the writeback.  The page fault path, which is
the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't
require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM
killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic.

As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already
so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem.  Moreover he notes:

: For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion
: which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The
: writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten
: extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on
: page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not
: safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+
[tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow]
Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 29, 2016
commit f0f3938 upstream.

Commit ff1e22e ("xen/events: Mask a moving irq") open-coded
irq_move_irq() but left out checking if the IRQ is disabled. This broke
resuming from suspend since it tries to move a (disabled) irq without
holding the IRQ's desc->lock. Fix it by adding in a check for disabled
IRQs.

The resulting stacktrace was:
kernel BUG at /build/linux-UbQGH5/linux-4.4.0/kernel/irq/migration.c:31!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xenfs xen_privcmd ...
CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: migration/0 Not tainted 4.4.0-22-generic #39-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.6.1-xs125180 05/04/2016
task: ffff88003d75ee00 ti: ffff88003d7bc000 task.ti: ffff88003d7bc000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810e26e2>]  [<ffffffff810e26e2>] irq_move_masked_irq+0xd2/0xe0
RSP: 0018:ffff88003d7bfc50  EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003d40ba00 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000100 RDI: ffff88003d40bad8
RBP: ffff88003d7bfc68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88003d000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000023c R12: ffff88003d40bad0
R13: ffffffff81f3a4a0 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 00000000ffffffff
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88003da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd4264de624 CR3: 0000000037922000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffff88003d40ba38 0000000000000024 0000000000000000 ffff88003d7bfca0
 ffffffff814c8d92 00000010813ef89d 00000000805ea732 0000000000000009
 0000000000000024 ffff88003cc39b80 ffff88003d7bfce0 ffffffff814c8f66
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff814c8d92>] eoi_pirq+0xb2/0xf0
 [<ffffffff814c8f66>] __startup_pirq+0xe6/0x150
 [<ffffffff814ca659>] xen_irq_resume+0x319/0x360
 [<ffffffff814c7e75>] xen_suspend+0xb5/0x180
 [<ffffffff81120155>] multi_cpu_stop+0xb5/0xe0
 [<ffffffff811200a0>] ? cpu_stop_queue_work+0x80/0x80
 [<ffffffff811203d0>] cpu_stopper_thread+0xb0/0x140
 [<ffffffff810a94e6>] ? finish_task_switch+0x76/0x220
 [<ffffffff810ca731>] ? __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x20
 [<ffffffff810a3935>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x105/0x160
 [<ffffffff810a3830>] ? sort_range+0x30/0x30
 [<ffffffff810a0588>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
 [<ffffffff810a04b0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1e0/0x1e0
 [<ffffffff8182568f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
 [<ffffffff810a04b0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1e0/0x1e0

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Dmole pushed a commit to Dmole/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 11, 2016
[ Upstream commit 32c2311 ]

Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ hardkernel#39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
 ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
 ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
 [<     inline     >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
 [<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
 [<     inline     >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
 [<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
 [<     inline     >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
 [<     inline     >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
 [<     inline     >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
 [<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
 [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                    ^
 ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

==================================================================

The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.

Fixes: c51ce49 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Dmole pushed a commit to Dmole/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 11, 2016
[ Upstream commit 32c2311 ]

Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ hardkernel#39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
 ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
 ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
 [<     inline     >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
 [<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
 [<     inline     >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
 [<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
 [<     inline     >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
 [<     inline     >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
 [<     inline     >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
 [<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
 [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                    ^
 ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

==================================================================

The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.

Fixes: c51ce49 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Dmole pushed a commit to Dmole/linux that referenced this pull request Jan 16, 2017
commit 1c7de2b upstream.

There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store some
non-standard blocks (example below).  However pci_vpd_size() returns the
length of the first block only assuming that there can be only one VPD "End
Tag".

Since 4e1a635 ("vfio/pci: Use kernel VPD access functions"), VFIO
blocks access beyond that offset, which prevents the guest "cxgb3" driver
from probing the device.  The host system does not have this problem as its
driver accesses the config space directly without pci_read_vpd().

Add a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value.  The maximum size
is taken from EEPROMSIZE in drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/common.h.
We do not read the tag as the cxgb3 driver does as the driver supports
writing to EEPROM/VPD and when it writes, it only checks for 8192 bytes
boundary.  The quirk is registered for all devices supported by the cxgb3
driver.

This adds a quirk to the PCI layer (not to the cxgb3 driver) as the cxgb3
driver itself accesses VPD directly and the problem only exists with the
vfio-pci driver (when cxgb3 is not running on the host and may not be even
loaded) which blocks accesses beyond the first block of VPD data.  However
vfio-pci itself does not have quirks mechanism so we add it to PCI.

This is the controller:
Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]

This is what I parsed from its VPD:
===
b'\x82*\x0010 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter\x90J\x00EC\x07D76809 FN\x0746K'
 0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
	b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter'
 002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
	#00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 '
	#0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897'
	hardkernel#14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897'
	#1e [MN] len=4: b'1037'
	hardkernel#25 [FC] len=4: b'5769'
	#2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V'
	#3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
 007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag

 0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
	b'S310E-SR-X      '
 0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
	#00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD             '
	hardkernel#13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2     '
	hardkernel#26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V  '
	hardkernel#39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
	hardkernel#48 [V0] len=6: b'175000'
	hardkernel#51 [V1] len=6: b'266666'
	#5a [V2] len=6: b'266666'
	hardkernel#63 [V3] len=6: b'2000  '
	#6c [V4] len=2: b'1 '
	hardkernel#71 [V5] len=6: b'c2    '
	#7a [V6] len=6: b'0     '
	hardkernel#83 [V7] len=2: b'1 '
	hardkernel#88 [V8] len=2: b'0 '
	#8d [V9] len=2: b'0 '
	hardkernel#92 [VA] len=2: b'0 '
	hardkernel#97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
 0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
	#00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp  '
	hardkernel#13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
	hardkernel#26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp  '
	hardkernel#39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
	#4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
 0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag

10f3 Large item 13315 bytes; name 0x62
!!! unknown item name 98: b'\xd0\x03\x00@`\x0c\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
===

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
codewalkerster pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 22, 2017
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
 ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
 ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
 [<     inline     >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
 [<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
 [<     inline     >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
 [<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
 [<     inline     >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
 [<     inline     >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
 [<     inline     >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
 [<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
 [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                    ^
 ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

==================================================================

The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.

Fixes: c51ce49 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Change-Id: I0ed2e71f87b1280ddeda828fa591789641195a67
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 3, 2018
[ Upstream commit b9b312a ]

syzkaller reported crashes in IPv6 stack [1]

Xin Long found that lo MTU was set to silly values.

IPv6 stack reacts to changes to small MTU, by disabling itself under
RTNL.

But there is a window where threads not using RTNL can see a wrong
device mtu. This can lead to surprises, in mld code where it is assumed
the mtu is suitable.

Fix this by reading device mtu once and checking IPv6 minimal MTU.

[1]
 skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:0000000010b86b8d len:196 put:20
 head:000000003b477e60 data:000000000e85441e tail:0xd4 end:0xc0 dev:lo
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
 Dumping ftrace buffer:
    (ftrace buffer empty)
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2-mm1+ #39
 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
 Google 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15c/0x1f0 net/core/skbuff.c:100
 RSP: 0018:ffff8801db307508 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000000082 RBX: ffff8801c517e840 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000082 RSI: 1ffff1003b660e61 RDI: ffffed003b660e95
 RBP: ffff8801db307570 R08: 1ffff1003b660e23 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff85bd4020
 R13: ffffffff84754ed2 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: ffff8801c4e26540
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000463610 CR3: 00000001c6698000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:109 [inline]
  skb_put+0x181/0x1c0 net/core/skbuff.c:1694
  add_grhead.isra.24+0x42/0x3b0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1695
  add_grec+0xa55/0x1060 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1817
  mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1903 [inline]
  mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x4d2/0x770 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2448
  call_timer_fn+0x23b/0x840 kernel/time/timer.c:1320
  expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1357 [inline]
  __run_timers+0x7e1/0xb60 kernel/time/timer.c:1660
  run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0xb0 kernel/time/timer.c:1686
  __do_softirq+0x29d/0xbb2 kernel/softirq.c:285
  invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
  irq_exit+0x1d3/0x210 kernel/softirq.c:405
  exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:540 [inline]
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
  apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:920

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Tested-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Dmole pushed a commit to Dmole/linux that referenced this pull request Jan 3, 2018
[ Upstream commit b9b312a ]

syzkaller reported crashes in IPv6 stack [1]

Xin Long found that lo MTU was set to silly values.

IPv6 stack reacts to changes to small MTU, by disabling itself under
RTNL.

But there is a window where threads not using RTNL can see a wrong
device mtu. This can lead to surprises, in mld code where it is assumed
the mtu is suitable.

Fix this by reading device mtu once and checking IPv6 minimal MTU.

[1]
 skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:0000000010b86b8d len:196 put:20
 head:000000003b477e60 data:000000000e85441e tail:0xd4 end:0xc0 dev:lo
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [hardkernel#1] SMP KASAN
 Dumping ftrace buffer:
    (ftrace buffer empty)
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2-mm1+ hardkernel#39
 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
 Google 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15c/0x1f0 net/core/skbuff.c:100
 RSP: 0018:ffff8801db307508 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000000082 RBX: ffff8801c517e840 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000082 RSI: 1ffff1003b660e61 RDI: ffffed003b660e95
 RBP: ffff8801db307570 R08: 1ffff1003b660e23 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff85bd4020
 R13: ffffffff84754ed2 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: ffff8801c4e26540
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000463610 CR3: 00000001c6698000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:109 [inline]
  skb_put+0x181/0x1c0 net/core/skbuff.c:1694
  add_grhead.isra.24+0x42/0x3b0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1695
  add_grec+0xa55/0x1060 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1817
  mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1903 [inline]
  mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x4d2/0x770 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2448
  call_timer_fn+0x23b/0x840 kernel/time/timer.c:1320
  expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1357 [inline]
  __run_timers+0x7e1/0xb60 kernel/time/timer.c:1660
  run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0xb0 kernel/time/timer.c:1686
  __do_softirq+0x29d/0xbb2 kernel/softirq.c:285
  invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
  irq_exit+0x1d3/0x210 kernel/softirq.c:405
  exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:540 [inline]
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
  apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:920

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Tested-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 22, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ]

syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().

Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
 #0:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
 __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
codewalkerster pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 5, 2018
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
 ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
 ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
 [<     inline     >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
 [<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
 [<     inline     >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
 [<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
 [<     inline     >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
 [<     inline     >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
 [<     inline     >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
 [<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
 [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [ 1116.897025] [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                    ^
 ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

==================================================================

The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.

Fixes: c51ce49 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Change-Id: I0ed2e71f87b1280ddeda828fa591789641195a67
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 15, 2018
[ Upstream commit f8b3903 ]

In case of TX timeout, fs_timeout() calls phy_stop(), which
triggers the following BUG_ON() as we are in interrupt.

[92708.199889] kernel BUG at drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482!
[92708.204985] Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
[92708.210119] PREEMPT
[92708.212107] CMPC885
[92708.214216] CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G        W       4.9.61 #39
[92708.223227] task: c60f0a40 task.stack: c6104000
[92708.227697] NIP: c02a84bc LR: c02a947c CTR: c02a93d8
[92708.232614] REGS: c6105c70 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G        W        (4.9.61)
[92708.241193] MSR: 00021032 <ME,IR,DR,RI>[92708.244818]   CR: 24000822  XER: 20000000
[92708.248767]
GPR00: c02a947c c6105d20 c60f0a40 c62b4c00 00000005 0000001f c069aad8 0001a688
GPR08: 00000007 00000100 c02a93d8 00000000 000005fc 00000000 c6213240 c06338e4
GPR16: 00000001 c06330d4 c0633094 00000000 c0680000 c6104000 c6104000 00000000
GPR24: 00000200 00000000 ffffffff 00000004 00000078 00009032 00000000 c62b4c00
NIP [c02a84bc] mdiobus_read+0x20/0x74
[92708.281517] LR [c02a947c] kszphy_config_intr+0xa4/0xc4
[92708.286547] Call Trace:
[92708.288980] [c6105d20] [c6104000] 0xc6104000 (unreliable)
[92708.294339] [c6105d40] [c02a947c] kszphy_config_intr+0xa4/0xc4
[92708.300098] [c6105d50] [c02a5330] phy_stop+0x60/0x9c
[92708.305007] [c6105d60] [c02c84d0] fs_timeout+0xdc/0x110
[92708.310197] [c6105d80] [c035cd48] dev_watchdog+0x268/0x2a0
[92708.315593] [c6105db0] [c0060288] call_timer_fn+0x34/0x17c
[92708.321014] [c6105dd0] [c00605f0] run_timer_softirq+0x21c/0x2e4
[92708.326887] [c6105e50] [c001e19c] __do_softirq+0xf4/0x2f4
[92708.332207] [c6105eb0] [c001e3c8] run_ksoftirqd+0x2c/0x40
[92708.337560] [c6105ec0] [c003b420] smpboot_thread_fn+0x1f0/0x258
[92708.343405] [c6105ef0] [c003745c] kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[92708.348217] [c6105f40] [c000c400] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
[92708.354275] Instruction dump:
[92708.357207] 7c0803a6 bbc10018 38210020 4e800020 7c0802a6 9421ffe0 54290024 bfc10018
[92708.364865] 90010024 7c7f1b78 81290008 552902ee <0f090000> 3bc3002c 7fc3f378 90810008
[92708.372711] ---[ end trace 42b05441616fafd7 ]---

This patch moves fs_timeout() actions into an async worker.

Fixes: commit 48257c4 ("Add fs_enet ethernet network driver, for several embedded platforms")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 15, 2018
commit 6528d88 upstream.

The USB core gets rightfully upset:

  usb 1-1: BOGUS urb flags, 240 --> 200
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 60 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 usb_submit_urb+0x2f8/0x3ed
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc6-00319-g5206d00a45c7 #39
  Hardware name: OLPC XO/XO, BIOS OLPC Ver 1.00.01 06/11/2014
  Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func
  EIP: usb_submit_urb+0x2f8/0x3ed
  Code: 75 06 8b 8f 80 00 00 00 8d 47 78 89 4d e4 89 55 e8 e8 35 1c f6 ff 8b 55 e8 56 52 8b 4d e4 51 50 68 e3 ce c7 c0 e8 ed 18 c6 ff <0f> 0b 83 c4 14 80 7d ef 01 74 0a 80 7d ef 03 0f 85 b8 00 00 00 8b
  EAX: 00000025 EBX: ce7d4980 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000001
  ESI: 00000200 EDI: ce7d8800 EBP: ce7f5ea8 ESP: ce7f5e70
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00210292
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 00e80000 CR4: 00000090
  Call Trace:
   ? if_usb_fw_timeo+0x64/0x64
   __if_usb_submit_rx_urb+0x85/0xe6
   ? if_usb_fw_timeo+0x64/0x64
   if_usb_submit_rx_urb_fwload+0xd/0xf
   if_usb_prog_firmware+0xc0/0x3db
   ? _request_firmware+0x54/0x47b
   ? _request_firmware+0x89/0x47b
   ? if_usb_probe+0x412/0x412
   lbs_fw_loaded+0x55/0xa6
   ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x12/0x14
   helper_firmware_cb+0x3c/0x3f
   request_firmware_work_func+0x37/0x6f
   process_one_work+0x164/0x25a
   worker_thread+0x1c4/0x284
   kthread+0xec/0xf1
   ? cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xf/0xf
   ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1a/0x1a
   ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38
  ---[ end trace 3ef1e3b2dd53852f ]---

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 21, 2019
commit 6528d88 upstream.

The USB core gets rightfully upset:

  usb 1-1: BOGUS urb flags, 240 --> 200
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 60 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 usb_submit_urb+0x2f8/0x3ed
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc6-00319-g5206d00a45c7 #39
  Hardware name: OLPC XO/XO, BIOS OLPC Ver 1.00.01 06/11/2014
  Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func
  EIP: usb_submit_urb+0x2f8/0x3ed
  Code: 75 06 8b 8f 80 00 00 00 8d 47 78 89 4d e4 89 55 e8 e8 35 1c f6 ff 8b 55 e8 56 52 8b 4d e4 51 50 68 e3 ce c7 c0 e8 ed 18 c6 ff <0f> 0b 83 c4 14 80 7d ef 01 74 0a 80 7d ef 03 0f 85 b8 00 00 00 8b
  EAX: 00000025 EBX: ce7d4980 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000001
  ESI: 00000200 EDI: ce7d8800 EBP: ce7f5ea8 ESP: ce7f5e70
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00210292
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 00e80000 CR4: 00000090
  Call Trace:
   ? if_usb_fw_timeo+0x64/0x64
   __if_usb_submit_rx_urb+0x85/0xe6
   ? if_usb_fw_timeo+0x64/0x64
   if_usb_submit_rx_urb_fwload+0xd/0xf
   if_usb_prog_firmware+0xc0/0x3db
   ? _request_firmware+0x54/0x47b
   ? _request_firmware+0x89/0x47b
   ? if_usb_probe+0x412/0x412
   lbs_fw_loaded+0x55/0xa6
   ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x12/0x14
   helper_firmware_cb+0x3c/0x3f
   request_firmware_work_func+0x37/0x6f
   process_one_work+0x164/0x25a
   worker_thread+0x1c4/0x284
   kthread+0xec/0xf1
   ? cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xf/0xf
   ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1a/0x1a
   ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38
  ---[ end trace 3ef1e3b2dd53852f ]---

Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 25, 2019
[ Upstream commit 042be0f ]

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200219

Reproduction way:
- mount image
- run poc code
- umount image

F2FS-fs (loop1): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:15364
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/segment.c:2061!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 17686 Comm: umount Tainted: G        W  O      4.18.0-rc2+ #39
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
EIP: update_sit_entry+0x459/0x4e0 [f2fs]
Code: e8 1c b5 fd ff 0f 0b 0f 0b 8b 45 e4 c7 44 24 08 9c 7a 6c f8 c7 44 24 04 bc 4a 6c f8 89 44 24 0c 8b 06 89 04 24 e8 f7 b4 fd ff <0f> 0b 8b 45 e4 0f b6 d2 89 54 24 10 c7 44 24 08 60 7a 6c f8 c7 44
EAX: 00000032 EBX: 000000f8 ECX: 00000002 EDX: 00000001
ESI: d7177000 EDI: f520fe68 EBP: d6477c6c ESP: d6477c34
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010282
CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7fbe000 CR3: 2a99b3c0 CR4: 000406f0
Call Trace:
 f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x124/0x580 [f2fs]
 do_write_page+0x78/0x150 [f2fs]
 f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x25/0xa0 [f2fs]
 __write_node_page+0x2bf/0x550 [f2fs]
 f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x60e/0x6d0 [f2fs]
 ? sync_inode_metadata+0x2f/0x40
 ? f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x28f/0x7d0 [f2fs]
 ? up_write+0x1e/0x80
 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x2a9/0x7d0 [f2fs]
 ? mark_held_locks+0x5d/0x80
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x50
 kill_f2fs_super+0x68/0x90 [f2fs]
 deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70
 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60
 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70
 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20
 task_work_run+0x81/0xa0
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x59/0xa7
 do_fast_syscall_32+0x1f5/0x22c
 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x53/0x86
EIP: 0xb7f95c51
Code: c1 1e f7 ff ff 89 e5 8b 55 08 85 d2 8b 81 64 cd ff ff 74 02 89 02 5d c3 8b 0c 24 c3 8b 1c 24 c3 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d 76 00 58 b8 77 00 00 00 cd 80 90 8d 76
EAX: 00000000 EBX: 0871ab90 ECX: bfb2cd00 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 0871ab90 EBP: 0871ab90 ESP: bfb2cd7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000246
Modules linked in: f2fs(O) crc32_generic bnep rfcomm bluetooth ecdh_generic snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq pcbc joydev aesni_intel snd_seq_device aes_i586 snd_timer crypto_simd snd cryptd soundcore mac_hid serio_raw video i2c_piix4 parport_pc ppdev lp parport hid_generic psmouse usbhid hid e1000 [last unloaded: f2fs]
---[ end trace d423f83982cfcdc5 ]---

The reason is, different log headers using the same segment, once
one log's next block address is used by another log, it will cause
panic as above.

Main area: 24 segs, 24 secs 24 zones
  - COLD  data: 0, 0, 0
  - WARM  data: 1, 1, 1
  - HOT   data: 20, 20, 20
  - Dir   dnode: 22, 22, 22
  - File   dnode: 22, 22, 22
  - Indir nodes: 21, 21, 21

So this patch adds sanity check to detect such condition to avoid
this issue.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 17, 2019
[ Upstream commit 042be0f ]

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200219

Reproduction way:
- mount image
- run poc code
- umount image

F2FS-fs (loop1): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:15364
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/segment.c:2061!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 17686 Comm: umount Tainted: G        W  O      4.18.0-rc2+ #39
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
EIP: update_sit_entry+0x459/0x4e0 [f2fs]
Code: e8 1c b5 fd ff 0f 0b 0f 0b 8b 45 e4 c7 44 24 08 9c 7a 6c f8 c7 44 24 04 bc 4a 6c f8 89 44 24 0c 8b 06 89 04 24 e8 f7 b4 fd ff <0f> 0b 8b 45 e4 0f b6 d2 89 54 24 10 c7 44 24 08 60 7a 6c f8 c7 44
EAX: 00000032 EBX: 000000f8 ECX: 00000002 EDX: 00000001
ESI: d7177000 EDI: f520fe68 EBP: d6477c6c ESP: d6477c34
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010282
CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7fbe000 CR3: 2a99b3c0 CR4: 000406f0
Call Trace:
 f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x124/0x580 [f2fs]
 do_write_page+0x78/0x150 [f2fs]
 f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x25/0xa0 [f2fs]
 __write_node_page+0x2bf/0x550 [f2fs]
 f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x60e/0x6d0 [f2fs]
 ? sync_inode_metadata+0x2f/0x40
 ? f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x28f/0x7d0 [f2fs]
 ? up_write+0x1e/0x80
 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x2a9/0x7d0 [f2fs]
 ? mark_held_locks+0x5d/0x80
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x50
 kill_f2fs_super+0x68/0x90 [f2fs]
 deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70
 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60
 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70
 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20
 task_work_run+0x81/0xa0
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x59/0xa7
 do_fast_syscall_32+0x1f5/0x22c
 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x53/0x86
EIP: 0xb7f95c51
Code: c1 1e f7 ff ff 89 e5 8b 55 08 85 d2 8b 81 64 cd ff ff 74 02 89 02 5d c3 8b 0c 24 c3 8b 1c 24 c3 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d 76 00 58 b8 77 00 00 00 cd 80 90 8d 76
EAX: 00000000 EBX: 0871ab90 ECX: bfb2cd00 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 0871ab90 EBP: 0871ab90 ESP: bfb2cd7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000246
Modules linked in: f2fs(O) crc32_generic bnep rfcomm bluetooth ecdh_generic snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq pcbc joydev aesni_intel snd_seq_device aes_i586 snd_timer crypto_simd snd cryptd soundcore mac_hid serio_raw video i2c_piix4 parport_pc ppdev lp parport hid_generic psmouse usbhid hid e1000 [last unloaded: f2fs]
---[ end trace d423f83982cfcdc5 ]---

The reason is, different log headers using the same segment, once
one log's next block address is used by another log, it will cause
panic as above.

Main area: 24 segs, 24 secs 24 zones
  - COLD  data: 0, 0, 0
  - WARM  data: 1, 1, 1
  - HOT   data: 20, 20, 20
  - Dir   dnode: 22, 22, 22
  - File   dnode: 22, 22, 22
  - Indir nodes: 21, 21, 21

So this patch adds sanity check to detect such condition to avoid
this issue.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2019
commit 2baae35 upstream.

synchronize_rcu() is fine when the rcu callbacks only need
to free memory (kfree_rcu() or direct kfree() call rcu call backs)

__dev_map_entry_free() is a bit more complex, so we need to make
sure that call queued __dev_map_entry_free() callbacks have completed.

sysbot report:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dev_map_flush_old kernel/bpf/devmap.c:365
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __dev_map_entry_free+0x2a8/0x300
kernel/bpf/devmap.c:379
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801b8da38c8 by task ksoftirqd/1/18

CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #39
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
  kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
  kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
  dev_map_flush_old kernel/bpf/devmap.c:365 [inline]
  __dev_map_entry_free+0x2a8/0x300 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:379
  __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:178 [inline]
  rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2558 [inline]
  invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2818 [inline]
  __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2785 [inline]
  rcu_process_callbacks+0xe9d/0x1760 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2802
  __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:284
  run_ksoftirqd+0x86/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:645
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x417/0x870 kernel/smpboot.c:164
  kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412

Allocated by task 6675:
  save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
  set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
  kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x152/0x780 mm/slab.c:3620
  kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:513 [inline]
  kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:706 [inline]
  dev_map_alloc+0x208/0x7f0 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:102
  find_and_alloc_map kernel/bpf/syscall.c:129 [inline]
  map_create+0x393/0x1010 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:453
  __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2351 [inline]
  __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2328 [inline]
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x303/0x510 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2328
  do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 26:
  save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
  set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
  __kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
  kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
  __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
  kfree+0xd9/0x260 mm/slab.c:3813
  dev_map_free+0x4fa/0x670 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:191
  bpf_map_free_deferred+0xba/0xf0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:262
  process_one_work+0xc64/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
  worker_thread+0x181/0x13a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
  kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801b8da37c0
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 264 bytes inside of
  512-byte region [ffff8801b8da37c0, ffff8801b8da39c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006e368c0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801da800940
index:0xffff8801b8da3540
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0007217b88 ffffea0006e30cc8 ffff8801da800940
raw: ffff8801b8da3540 ffff8801b8da3040 0000000100000004 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff8801b8da3780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff8801b8da3800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff8801b8da3880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                               ^
  ffff8801b8da3900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff8801b8da3980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 546ac1f ("bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+457d3e2ffbcf31aee5c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ardje pushed a commit to ardje/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 4, 2019
…rq()

lan78xx_status() will run with interrupts enabled due to the change in
ed194d1 ("usb: core: remove local_irq_save() around ->complete()
handler"). generic_handle_irq() expects to be run with IRQs disabled.

[    4.886203] 000: irq 79 handler irq_default_primary_handler+0x0/0x8 enabled interrupts
[    4.886243] 000: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/irq/handle.c:152 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x154/0x168
[    4.896294] 000: Modules linked in:
[    4.896301] 000: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.6 hardkernel#39
[    4.896310] 000: Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ (DT)
[    4.896315] 000: pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[    4.896321] 000: pc : __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x154/0x168
[    4.896331] 000: lr : __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x154/0x168
[    4.896339] 000: sp : ffff000010003cc0
[    4.896346] 000: x29: ffff000010003cc0 x28: 0000000000000060
[    4.896355] 000: x27: ffff000011021980 x26: ffff00001189c72b
[    4.896364] 000: x25: ffff000011702bc0 x24: ffff800036d6e400
[    4.896373] 000: x23: 000000000000004f x22: ffff000010003d64
[    4.896381] 000: x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000002
[    4.896390] 000: x19: ffff8000371c8480 x18: 0000000000000060
[    4.896398] 000: x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 00000000000000eb
[    4.896406] 000: x15: ffff000011712d18 x14: 7265746e69206465
[    4.896414] 000: x13: ffff000010003ba0 x12: ffff000011712df0
[    4.896422] 000: x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff000011712e08
[    4.896430] 000: x9 : 0000000000000001 x8 : 000000000003c920
[    4.896437] 000: x7 : ffff0000118cc410 x6 : ffff0000118c7f00
[    4.896445] 000: x5 : 000000000003c920 x4 : 0000000000004510
[    4.896453] 000: x3 : ffff000011712dc8 x2 : 0000000000000000
[    4.896461] 000: x1 : 73a3f67df94c1500 x0 : 0000000000000000
[    4.896466] 000: Call trace:
[    4.896471] 000:  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x154/0x168
[    4.896481] 000:  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x50/0xb0
[    4.896489] 000:  handle_irq_event+0x40/0x98
[    4.896497] 000:  handle_simple_irq+0xa4/0xf0
[    4.896505] 000:  generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x38
[    4.896513] 000:  intr_complete+0xb0/0xe0
[    4.896525] 000:  __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x58/0xd8
[    4.896533] 000:  usb_giveback_urb_bh+0xd0/0x170
[    4.896539] 000:  tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x9c/0x128
[    4.896549] 000:  tasklet_hi_action+0x24/0x30
[    4.896556] 000:  __do_softirq+0x120/0x23c
[    4.896564] 000:  irq_exit+0xb8/0xd8
[    4.896571] 000:  __handle_domain_irq+0x64/0xb8
[    4.896579] 000:  bcm2836_arm_irqchip_handle_irq+0x60/0xc0
[    4.896586] 000:  el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
[    4.896592] 000:  arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18
[    4.896601] 000:  do_idle+0x200/0x280
[    4.896608] 000:  cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x28
[    4.896615] 000:  rest_init+0xb4/0xc0
[    4.896623] 000:  arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
[    4.896632] 000:  start_kernel+0x454/0x480

Fixes: ed194d1 ("usb: core: remove local_irq_save() around ->complete() handler")
Cc: Woojung Huh <woojung.huh@microchip.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Cc: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@gmx.net>
Cc: Jisheng Zhang <Jisheng.Zhang@synaptics.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
tobetter pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 15, 2020
[ Upstream commit 3b70683 ]

ubsan report this warning, fix it by adding a unsigned suffix.

UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_common.c:2246:26
65535 * 65537 cannot be represented in type 'int'
CPU: 21 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u256:0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc3-debug+ #39
Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 03/27/2020
Workqueue: ixgbe ixgbe_service_task [ixgbe]
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3f0
 show_stack+0x28/0x38
 dump_stack+0x154/0x1e4
 ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x60
 handle_overflow+0xf8/0x148
 __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x34/0x48
 ixgbe_fc_enable_generic+0x4d0/0x590 [ixgbe]
 ixgbe_service_task+0xc20/0x1f78 [ixgbe]
 process_one_work+0x8f0/0xf18
 worker_thread+0x430/0x6d0
 kthread+0x218/0x238
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit b377add ]

Both the function that migrates all the chunks within a region and the
function that migrates all the entries within a chunk call
list_first_entry() on the respective lists without checking that the
lists are not empty. This is incorrect usage of the API, which leads to
the following warning [1].

Fix by returning if the lists are empty as there is nothing to migrate
in this case.

[1]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6437 at drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_acl_tcam.c:1266 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x1f1/0>
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 6437 Comm: kworker/0:37 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3-custom-00883-g94a65f079ef6 #39
Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019
Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work
RIP: 0010:mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x1f1/0x2c0
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x6c/0x4a0
 process_one_work+0x151/0x370
 worker_thread+0x2cb/0x3e0
 kthread+0xd0/0x100
 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>

Fixes: 6f9579d ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl: Remember where to continue rehash migration")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Zubkov <green@qrator.net>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4628e9a22d1d84818e28310abbbc498e7bc31bc9.1713797103.git.petrm@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit b377add ]

Both the function that migrates all the chunks within a region and the
function that migrates all the entries within a chunk call
list_first_entry() on the respective lists without checking that the
lists are not empty. This is incorrect usage of the API, which leads to
the following warning [1].

Fix by returning if the lists are empty as there is nothing to migrate
in this case.

[1]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6437 at drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_acl_tcam.c:1266 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x1f1/0>
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 6437 Comm: kworker/0:37 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3-custom-00883-g94a65f079ef6 #39
Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019
Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work
RIP: 0010:mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x1f1/0x2c0
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x6c/0x4a0
 process_one_work+0x151/0x370
 worker_thread+0x2cb/0x3e0
 kthread+0xd0/0x100
 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>

Fixes: 6f9579d ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl: Remember where to continue rehash migration")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Zubkov <green@qrator.net>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4628e9a22d1d84818e28310abbbc498e7bc31bc9.1713797103.git.petrm@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mdrjr pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 28, 2024
[ Upstream commit f6944d4 ]

Lockdep reports the below circular locking dependency issue.  The
mmap_lock acquisition while holding pci_bus_sem is due to the use of
copy_to_user() from within a pci_walk_bus() callback.

Building the devices array directly into the user buffer is only for
convenience.  Instead we can allocate a local buffer for the array,
bounded by the number of devices on the bus/slot, fill the device
information into this local buffer, then copy it into the user buffer
outside the bus walk callback.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5+ #39 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
CPU 0/KVM/4113 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff99a609ee18a8 (&vdev->vma_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]

but task is already holding lock:
ffff99a243a052a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vaddr_get_pfns+0x3f/0x170 [vfio_iommu_type1]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
       lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
       __might_fault+0x5c/0x80
       _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x60
       vfio_pci_fill_devs+0x9f/0x130 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_walk_wrapper+0x45/0x60 [vfio_pci_core]
       __pci_walk_bus+0x6b/0xb0
       vfio_pci_ioctl_get_pci_hot_reset_info+0x10b/0x1d0 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_core_ioctl+0x1cb/0x400 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x7e/0x140 [vfio]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #2 (pci_bus_sem){++++}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
       lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
       down_read+0x3e/0x160
       pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus.part.0+0x33/0x2d0
       pci_reset_bus+0xdd/0x160
       vfio_pci_dev_set_hot_reset+0x256/0x270 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_ioctl_pci_hot_reset_groups+0x1a3/0x280 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_core_ioctl+0x3b5/0x400 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x7e/0x140 [vfio]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #1 (&vdev->memory_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
       lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
       down_write+0x3b/0xc0
       vfio_pci_zap_and_down_write_memory_lock+0x1c/0x30 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_basic_config_write+0x281/0x340 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_config_do_rw+0x1fa/0x300 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_config_rw+0x75/0xe50 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfio_pci_rw+0xea/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
       vfs_write+0xea/0x520
       __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x90/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #0 (&vdev->vma_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       check_prev_add+0xeb/0xcc0
       validate_chain+0x465/0x530
       __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
       lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
       __mutex_lock+0x97/0xde0
       vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
       __do_fault+0x31/0x160
       do_pte_missing+0x65/0x3b0
       __handle_mm_fault+0x303/0x720
       handle_mm_fault+0x10f/0x460
       fixup_user_fault+0x7f/0x1f0
       follow_fault_pfn+0x66/0x1c0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vaddr_get_pfns+0xf2/0x170 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vfio_pin_pages_remote+0x348/0x4e0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vfio_pin_map_dma+0xd2/0x330 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vfio_dma_do_map+0x2c0/0x440 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xc5/0x1d0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &vdev->vma_lock --> pci_bus_sem --> &mm->mmap_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

block dm-0: the capability attribute has been deprecated.
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                               lock(pci_bus_sem);
                               lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
  lock(&vdev->vma_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

2 locks held by CPU 0/KVM/4113:
 #0: ffff99a25f294888 (&iommu->lock#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_dma_do_map+0x60/0x440 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 #1: ffff99a243a052a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vaddr_get_pfns+0x3f/0x170 [vfio_iommu_type1]

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 4113 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5+ #39
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T640/04WYPY, BIOS 2.15.1 06/16/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0xa0
 check_noncircular+0x131/0x150
 check_prev_add+0xeb/0xcc0
 ? add_chain_cache+0x10a/0x2f0
 ? __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
 validate_chain+0x465/0x530
 __lock_acquire+0x4e4/0xb90
 lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
 ? vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110
 __mutex_lock+0x97/0xde0
 ? vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 ? lock_acquire+0xbc/0x2d0
 ? vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
 ? vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 vfio_pci_mmap_fault+0x35/0x1a0 [vfio_pci_core]
 __do_fault+0x31/0x160
 do_pte_missing+0x65/0x3b0
 __handle_mm_fault+0x303/0x720
 handle_mm_fault+0x10f/0x460
 fixup_user_fault+0x7f/0x1f0
 follow_fault_pfn+0x66/0x1c0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vaddr_get_pfns+0xf2/0x170 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vfio_pin_pages_remote+0x348/0x4e0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vfio_pin_map_dma+0xd2/0x330 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vfio_dma_do_map+0x2c0/0x440 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xc5/0x1d0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xc0
 do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x170
 ? rcu_core+0x8d/0x250
 ? __lock_release+0x5e/0x160
 ? rcu_core+0x8d/0x250
 ? lock_release+0x5f/0x120
 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xb/0x190
 ? irqtime_account_irq+0x40/0xc0
 ? __local_bh_enable+0x54/0x60
 ? __do_softirq+0x315/0x3ca
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x97/0x140
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f8300d0357b
Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 68 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f82ef3fb948 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f8300d0357b
RDX: 00007f82ef3fb990 RSI: 0000000000003b71 RDI: 0000000000000023
RBP: 00007f82ef3fb9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000561b7e0bcac2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000200000000 R14: 0000381800000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240503143138.3562116-1-alex.williamson@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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2 participants