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MTD driver to host PNOR issue #51

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cyrilbur-ibm opened this issue Feb 17, 2016 · 9 comments
Closed

MTD driver to host PNOR issue #51

cyrilbur-ibm opened this issue Feb 17, 2016 · 9 comments
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@cyrilbur-ibm
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I've been testing out the MTD driver.
Minimal testing has uncovered an issue in that reading from /dev/mtd7 (the host PNOR) is unreliable.
$ dd if=/dev/mtd7 of=/tmp/pnor count=1
Appears to work, what looks like an FFS header is in /tmp/pnor. Repeating that command reads all FF.

Didn't reproduce on /dev/mtd0.

@cyrilbur-ibm
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uname -a
Linux palmetto 4.3.4-fe68a785afbaa305506c87c6324f70ed0605385c #1 Mon Feb 8 16:55:24 AWST 2016 armv5tejl GNU/Linux

@mdmillerii
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I haven't tested pnor a lot. I did see something similar once in the last week where the driver would repeatedly read FF.

pflash can bypass the bmc and was able to see data when this occurred. A reboot for me allowed me to read the flash repeatedly and I was not able to recreate the FF even with tunning.

There is still call to pflash to tune the controller that is happening behind the drivers back, and also a write to the controller register of 2404 in the aspeed hard-coded inits. Also the driver does not fully clear the original modes it finds in the controller; any of these may be related.

shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 22, 2016
commit 9ce119f upstream.

A line discipline which does not define a receive_buf() method can
can cause a GPF if data is ever received [1]. Oddly, this was known
to the author of n_tracesink in 2011, but never fixed.

[1] GPF report
    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
    IP: [<          (null)>]           (null)
    PGD 3752d067 PUD 37a7b067 PMD 0
    Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 2 PID: 148 Comm: kworker/u10:2 Not tainted 4.4.0-rc2+ #51
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
    task: ffff88006da94440 ti: ffff88006db60000 task.ti: ffff88006db60000
    RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>]  [<          (null)>]           (null)
    RSP: 0018:ffff88006db67b50  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000102 RBX: ffff88003ab32f88 RCX: 0000000000000102
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88003ab330a6 RDI: ffff88003aabd388
    RBP: ffff88006db67c48 R08: ffff88003ab32f9c R09: ffff88003ab31fb0
    R10: ffff88003ab32fa8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
    R13: ffff88006db67c20 R14: ffffffff863df820 R15: ffff88003ab31fb8
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037938000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Stack:
     ffffffff829f46f1 ffff88006da94bf8 ffff88006da94bf8 0000000000000000
     ffff88003ab31fb0 ffff88003aabd438 ffff88003ab31ff8 ffff88006430fd90
     ffff88003ab32f9c ffffed0007557a87 1ffff1000db6cf78 ffff88003ab32078
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff8127cf91>] process_one_work+0x8f1/0x17a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2030
     [<ffffffff8127df14>] worker_thread+0xd4/0x1180 kernel/workqueue.c:2162
     [<ffffffff8128faaf>] kthread+0x1cf/0x270 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1302
     [<ffffffff852a7c2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
    Code:  Bad RIP value.
    RIP  [<          (null)>]           (null)
     RSP <ffff88006db67b50>
    CR2: 0000000000000000
    ---[ end trace a587f8947e54d6ea ]---

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 21, 2016
A line discipline which does not define a receive_buf() method can
can cause a GPF if data is ever received [1]. Oddly, this was known
to the author of n_tracesink in 2011, but never fixed.

[1] GPF report
    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
    IP: [<          (null)>]           (null)
    PGD 3752d067 PUD 37a7b067 PMD 0
    Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 2 PID: 148 Comm: kworker/u10:2 Not tainted 4.4.0-rc2+ #51
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
    task: ffff88006da94440 ti: ffff88006db60000 task.ti: ffff88006db60000
    RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>]  [<          (null)>]           (null)
    RSP: 0018:ffff88006db67b50  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000102 RBX: ffff88003ab32f88 RCX: 0000000000000102
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88003ab330a6 RDI: ffff88003aabd388
    RBP: ffff88006db67c48 R08: ffff88003ab32f9c R09: ffff88003ab31fb0
    R10: ffff88003ab32fa8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
    R13: ffff88006db67c20 R14: ffffffff863df820 R15: ffff88003ab31fb8
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037938000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Stack:
     ffffffff829f46f1 ffff88006da94bf8 ffff88006da94bf8 0000000000000000
     ffff88003ab31fb0 ffff88003aabd438 ffff88003ab31ff8 ffff88006430fd90
     ffff88003ab32f9c ffffed0007557a87 1ffff1000db6cf78 ffff88003ab32078
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff8127cf91>] process_one_work+0x8f1/0x17a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2030
     [<ffffffff8127df14>] worker_thread+0xd4/0x1180 kernel/workqueue.c:2162
     [<ffffffff8128faaf>] kthread+0x1cf/0x270 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1302
     [<ffffffff852a7c2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
    Code:  Bad RIP value.
    RIP  [<          (null)>]           (null)
     RSP <ffff88006db67b50>
    CR2: 0000000000000000
    ---[ end trace a587f8947e54d6ea ]---

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
@shenki
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shenki commented Mar 29, 2016

@cyrilbur-ibm can you please clarify what the issue is?

Please try to reproduce on the latest image.

@shenki shenki added the bug label Mar 29, 2016
@shenki shenki closed this as completed Apr 18, 2016
amboar pushed a commit to amboar/linux that referenced this issue Aug 5, 2016
… switches

commit 5ff8eaa upstream.

If cgroup writeback is in use, an inode is associated with a cgroup
for writeback.  If the inode's main dirtier changes to another cgroup,
the association gets updated asynchronously.  Nothing was pinning the
superblock while such switches are in progress and superblock could go
away while async switching is pending or in progress leading to
crashes like the following.

 kernel BUG at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:319!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [openbmc#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 CPU: 1 PID: 29158 Comm: kworker/1:10 Not tainted 4.5.0-rc3 openbmc#51
 Hardware name: Google Google, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
 Workqueue: events inode_switch_wbs_work_fn
 task: ffff880213dbbd40 ti: ffff880209264000 task.ti: ffff880209264000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff803e6922>]  [<ffffffff803e6922>] start_this_handle+0x382/0x3e0
 RSP: 0018:ffff880209267c30  EFLAGS: 00010202
 ...
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff803e6be4>] jbd2__journal_start+0xf4/0x190
  [<ffffffff803cfc7e>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x4e/0x70
  [<ffffffff803b31ec>] ext4_evict_inode+0x12c/0x3d0
  [<ffffffff8035338b>] evict+0xbb/0x190
  [<ffffffff80354190>] iput+0x130/0x190
  [<ffffffff80360223>] inode_switch_wbs_work_fn+0x343/0x4c0
  [<ffffffff80279819>] process_one_work+0x129/0x300
  [<ffffffff80279b16>] worker_thread+0x126/0x480
  [<ffffffff8027ed14>] kthread+0xc4/0xe0
  [<ffffffff809771df>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70

Fix it by bumping s_active while cgroup association switching is in
flight.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CAAeU0aNCq7LGODvVGRU-oU_o-6enii5ey0p1c26D1ZzYwkDc5A@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: d10c809 ("writeback: implement foreign cgroup inode bdi_writeback switching")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
@mdmillerii
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I was able to recreate this on my latest 4.7 kernel by:

  1. boot kernel
  2. pflash -m -i works
  3. pflash -i (without -m so using direct register access)
  4. pflash -m -i complains chip looks erased.
  5. restoring 0x1e630004 with devmem did not fix pflash -m -i
  6. devmem 0x30000000 32 is not 0xff data (nor a few small offsets). (did not try /dev/mtd7)
  7. pflash -i continued to work
  8. reboot fixed pflash -m -i until next direct access (without -m).

@cyrilbur-ibm
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On Thu, 2016-09-15 at 16:30 -0700, Milton D. Miller II wrote:

I was able to recreate this on my latest 4.7 kernel by:

  1. boot kernel
  2. pflash -m -i works
  3. pflash -i (without -m so using direct register access)
  4. pflash -m -i complains chip looks erased.
  5. restoring 0x1e630004 with devmem did not fix pflash -m -i
  6. devmem 0x30000000 32 is not 0xff data (nor a few small offsets).
    (did not try /dev/mtd7)
  7. pflash -i continued to work
  8. reboot fixed pflash -m -i until next direct access (without -m).

I hesitate to say that this is working as intended...

When you do a -m you're using the kernel driver. If you drop the -m
you're accessing hardware directly as you've correctly pointed out, at
that point the state of the hardware has changed out from under the
kernel, the most common response from the hardware when a drivers
actions do not correspond with the state of the hardware is all 0xff
reads. The kernel doesn't have a way of distinguishing legitimate all
0xff reads and bogus ones so it happily returns the bad reads.

I suppose you're hinting that using devmem to put the hardware back
into the state the kernel thinks it is should restore -m functionality,
and it probably does but, exactly what is that state?

pflash -i should always continue to work as it always inits the
hardware each time you run the binary.

Reboot obviously fixes the kernel as the kernel reinits the hardware
for its self.

What do you expect should happen?

Cyril


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@mdmillerii
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@cyrilbur-ibm actually it did not make it working, but it may be a mismatch between the kernel and the state of the flash eg command size. So in some regards this says we should choose between the kernel knowing about this hardware and pflash managing it with the host.

This sort of goes back to the plan for openbmc/openbmc#553 and my comment in the driver line 415-418

My understanding is there is a ipmi handshake to arbitrate with opal for flash access but I haven't looked it up. I was told hostboot always said not now.

But this does raise the issue: should we totally disable the pnor in the current kernel so its boot does not interrupt the host?

@cyrilbur-ibm
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On Thu, 2016-09-15 at 16:56 -0700, Milton D. Miller II wrote:

@cyrilbur-ibm actually it did not make it working, but it may be a
mismatch between the kernel and the state of the flash eg command
size. So in some regards this says we should choose between the
kernel knowing about this hardware and pflash managing it with the
host.

Were you running pflash on the host? What was the BMC doing during this
time? This is quite a different situation.

I'm quite sure I ripped out direct access by pflash on the host. When
running on the host pflash will access the flash through firmware
(skiboot) via linux and MTD, I believe skiboot and the BMC do have a
method for arbitrating flash access.

This sort of goes back to the plan for openbmc/openbmc#553 and my
comment in the driver line 415-418

This all seems correct.

My understanding is there is a ipmi handshake to arbitrate with opal
for flash access but I haven't looked it up.

AFAIK skiboot and AMI firmware have this. We would need to connect it
up in OpenBMC if it isn't already.

I was told hostboot always said not now.
But this does raise the issue: should we totally disable the pnor in
the current kernel so its boot does not interrupt the host?

Perhaps, this won't save us from people running pflash directly on the
BMC though...


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@mdmillerii
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I was running the pflash binary on the BMC that was in the root fs already on my target system (some rev ~120 commits past 1.0.0 according to /etc/os-release). I did not try booting the host. I know pflash will tune for fast-read while the kernel still does slow reads. The kernel driver tries to use a conservative clock value which is in the control register. It should always write the full control register from the values it saves at initialization (driver probe).

Our present skeleton kicks off pflash tune against the host pnor, and also uses pflash to update the BMC. The boot process calls pflash to write the base device tree with the BMC discovered inventory items.

@cyrilbur-ibm
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On Thu, 2016-09-15 at 17:30 -0700, Milton D. Miller II wrote:

I was running the pflash binary on the BMC that was in the root fs
already on my target system (some rev ~120 commits past 1.0.0
according to /etc/os-release).  I did not try booting the host.  I
know pflash will tune for fast-read while the kernel still does slow
reads.  The kernel driver tries to use a conservative clock value
which is in the control register.  It should always write the full
control register from the values it saves at initialization (driver
probe).

Yeah so definitely has the BMC kernel and pflash accessing the same
regs and that didn't go well. We don't need to disable the kernel
driver, we simply need to ensure that either always pflash -m or never
use the kernel driver. Obviously the safest option is to disable it. I
must stress here that this is only true and a good idea while the host
is off!

Since we don't have the arbitration between skiboot and BMC for flash
access, we must never use either the kernel driver or pflash while
the host is on! That is more or less ok since pflash on the host works
fine so the host can flash its self.

Our present skeleton kicks off > pflash tune against the host > pnor, and also uses pflash to update the BMC. The boot process calls > pflash to write the base device tree with the BMC discovered inventory items.


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shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 5, 2017
commit 9d7f29c upstream.

calculate_min_delta() may incorrectly access a 4th element of buf2[]
which only has 3 elements. This may trigger undefined behaviour and has
been reported to cause strange crashes in start_kernel() sometime after
timer initialization when built with GCC 5.3, possibly due to
register/stack corruption:

sched_clock: 32 bits at 200MHz, resolution 5ns, wraps every 10737418237ns
CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffb0aa, epc == 8067daa8, ra == 8067da84
Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.18 #51
task: 8065e3e0 task.stack: 80644000
$ 0   : 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000
$ 4   : 8065b4d0 00000000 805d0000 00000010
$ 8   : 00000010 80321400 fffff000 812de408
$12   : 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff
$16   : 00000002 ffffffff 80660000 806a666c
$20   : 806c0000 00000000 00000000 00000000
$24   : 00000000 00000010
$28   : 80644000 80645ed0 00000000 8067da84
Hi    : 00000000
Lo    : 00000000
epc   : 8067daa8 start_kernel+0x33c/0x500
ra    : 8067da84 start_kernel+0x318/0x500
Status: 11000402 KERNEL EXL
Cause : 4080040c (ExcCode 03)
BadVA : ffffb0aa
PrId  : 0501992c (MIPS 1004Kc)
Modules linked in:
Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo=80644000, task=8065e3e0, tls=00000000)
Call Trace:
[<8067daa8>] start_kernel+0x33c/0x500
Code: 24050240  0c0131f9  24849c64 <a200b0a8> 41606020  000000c0  0c1a45e6 00000000  0c1a5f44

UBSAN also detects the same issue:

================================================================
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in arch/mips/kernel/cevt-r4k.c:85:41
load of address 80647e4c with insufficient space
for an object of type 'unsigned int'
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.18 #47
Call Trace:
[<80028f70>] show_stack+0x88/0xa4
[<80312654>] dump_stack+0x84/0xc0
[<8034163c>] ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x50
[<803417d8>] __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch+0x160/0x168
[<8002dab0>] r4k_clockevent_init+0x544/0x764
[<80684d34>] time_init+0x18/0x90
[<8067fa5c>] start_kernel+0x2f0/0x500
=================================================================

buf2[] is intentionally only 3 elements so that the last element is the
median once 5 samples have been inserted, so explicitly prevent the
possibility of comparing against the 4th element rather than extending
the array.

Fixes: 1fa4055 ("MIPS: cevt-r4k: Dynamically calculate min_delta_ns")
Reported-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Tested-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/15892/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 5, 2017
commit 768d64f upstream.

Driver should provide its own struct device for all DMA-mapping calls instead
of extracting device pointer from DMA engine channel. Although this is harmless
from the driver operation perspective on ARM architecture, it is always good
to use the DMA mapping API in a proper way. This patch fixes following DMA API
debug warning:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at lib/dma-debug.c:1241 check_sync+0x520/0x9f4
samsung-uart 12c20000.serial: DMA-API: device driver tries to sync DMA memory it has not allocated [device address=0x000000006df0f580] [size=64 bytes]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00137-g07ca963 #51
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c011aaa4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c01127c0>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c01127c0>] (show_stack) from [<c06ba5d8>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xa0)
[<c06ba5d8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0139528>] (__warn+0x14c/0x180)
[<c0139528>] (__warn) from [<c01395a4>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0x50)
[<c01395a4>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0729058>] (check_sync+0x520/0x9f4)
[<c0729058>] (check_sync) from [<c072967c>] (debug_dma_sync_single_for_device+0x88/0xc8)
[<c072967c>] (debug_dma_sync_single_for_device) from [<c0803c10>] (s3c24xx_serial_start_tx_dma+0x100/0x2f8)
[<c0803c10>] (s3c24xx_serial_start_tx_dma) from [<c0804338>] (s3c24xx_serial_tx_chars+0x198/0x33c)

Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Fixes: 62c37ee ("serial: samsung: add dma reqest/release functions")
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 30, 2018
commit c7a8978 upstream.

syzkaller managed to trigger the following bug through fault injection:

  [...]
  [  141.043668] verifier bug. No program starts at insn 3
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [  141.047355] CPU: 3 PID: 4072 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4+ #51
  [  141.048446] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
  [  141.049877] Call Trace:
  [  141.050324]  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  [  141.050324]  dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  [  141.050950]  ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.2+0x52/0x52 lib/dump_stack.c:60
  [  141.051837]  panic+0x238/0x4e7 kernel/panic.c:184
  [  141.052386]  ? add_taint.cold.5+0x16/0x16 kernel/panic.c:385
  [  141.053101]  ? __warn.cold.8+0x148/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:537
  [  141.053814]  ? __warn.cold.8+0x117/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:530
  [  141.054506]  ? get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.054506]  ? fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.054506]  ? bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [  141.055163]  __warn.cold.8+0x163/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:538
  [  141.055820]  ? get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.055820]  ? fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.055820]  ? bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [...]

What happens in jit_subprogs() is that kcalloc() for the subprog func
buffer is failing with NULL where we then bail out. Latter is a plain
return -ENOMEM, and this is definitely not okay since earlier in the
loop we are walking all subprogs and temporarily rewrite insn->off to
remember the subprog id as well as insn->imm to temporarily point the
call to __bpf_call_base + 1 for the initial JIT pass. Thus, bailing
out in such state and handing this over to the interpreter is troublesome
since later/subsequent e.g. find_subprog() lookups are based on wrong
insn->imm.

Therefore, once we hit this point, we need to jump to out_free path
where we undo all changes from earlier loop, so that interpreter can
work on unmodified insn->{off,imm}.

Another point is that should find_subprog() fail in jit_subprogs() due
to a verifier bug, then we also should not simply defer the program to
the interpreter since also here we did partial modifications. Instead
we should just bail out entirely and return an error to the user who is
trying to load the program.

Fixes: 1c2a088 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")
Reported-by: syzbot+7d427828b2ea6e592804@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 4, 2019
commit cf657d2 upstream.

Due to quadratic behavior of x25_new_lci(), syzbot was able
to trigger an rcu stall.

Fix this by not blocking BH for the whole duration of
the function, and inserting a reschedule point when possible.

If we care enough, using a bitmap could get rid of the quadratic
behavior.

syzbot report :

rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt self-detected stall on CPU
rcu:    0-...!: (10500 ticks this GP) idle=4fa/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=283376/283376 fqs=0
rcu:     (t=10501 jiffies g=383105 q=136)
rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10502 jiffies! g383105 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x402 ->cpu=0
rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump:
rcu_preempt     I28928    10      2 0x80000000
Call Trace:
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2844 [inline]
 __schedule+0x817/0x1cc0 kernel/sched/core.c:3485
 schedule+0x92/0x180 kernel/sched/core.c:3529
 schedule_timeout+0x4db/0xfd0 kernel/time/timer.c:1803
 rcu_gp_fqs_loop kernel/rcu/tree.c:1948 [inline]
 rcu_gp_kthread+0x956/0x17a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2105
 kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 8759 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc4+ #51
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold+0x63/0xa4 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:101
 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x1be/0x236 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
 arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/apic/hw_nmi.c:38
 trigger_single_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:164 [inline]
 rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x183/0x1cf kernel/rcu/tree.c:1211
 print_cpu_stall kernel/rcu/tree.c:1348 [inline]
 check_cpu_stall kernel/rcu/tree.c:1422 [inline]
 rcu_pending kernel/rcu/tree.c:3018 [inline]
 rcu_check_callbacks.cold+0x500/0xa4a kernel/rcu/tree.c:2521
 update_process_times+0x32/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1635
 tick_sched_handle+0xa2/0x190 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:161
 tick_sched_timer+0x47/0x130 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1271
 __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1389 [inline]
 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x33e/0xde0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1451
 hrtimer_interrupt+0x314/0x770 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1509
 local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1035 [inline]
 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x120/0x570 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1060
 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:807
 </IRQ>
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:193 [inline]
RIP: 0010:queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x13e/0x290 kernel/locking/qrwlock.c:86
Code: 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8d 2c 01 41 83 c7 03 41 0f b6 45 00 41 38 c7 7c 08 84 c0 0f 85 0c 01 00 00 8b 03 3d 00 01 00 00 74 1a f3 90 <41> 0f b6 55 00 41 38 d7 7c eb 84 d2 74 e7 48 89 df e8 6c 0f 4f 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88805f117bd8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffffffff89413ba0 RCX: 1ffffffff1282774
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff89413ba0
RBP: ffff88805f117c70 R08: 1ffffffff1282774 R09: fffffbfff1282775
R10: fffffbfff1282774 R11: ffffffff89413ba3 R12: 00000000000000ff
R13: fffffbfff1282774 R14: 1ffff1100be22f7d R15: 0000000000000003
 queued_write_lock include/asm-generic/qrwlock.h:104 [inline]
 do_raw_write_lock+0x1d6/0x290 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:203
 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:204 [inline]
 _raw_write_lock_bh+0x3b/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312
 x25_insert_socket+0x21/0xe0 net/x25/af_x25.c:267
 x25_bind+0x273/0x340 net/x25/af_x25.c:705
 __sys_bind+0x23f/0x290 net/socket.c:1505
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1516 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1514 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1514
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e39
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fafccd0dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457e39
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fafccd0e6d4
R13: 00000000004bdf8b R14: 00000000004ce4b8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 8752 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc4+ #51
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__x25_find_socket+0x78/0x120 net/x25/af_x25.c:328
Code: 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 18 00 0f 85 a6 00 00 00 4d 8b 64 24 68 4d 85 e4 74 7f e8 03 97 3d fb 49 83 ec 68 74 74 e8 f8 96 3d fb <49> 8d bc 24 88 04 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 0f b6 04 18 84 c0 74
RSP: 0018:ffff8880639efc58 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffc9000e677000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff863244b8 RDI: ffff88806a764628
RBP: ffff8880639efc80 R08: ffff8880a80d05c0 R09: fffffbfff1282775
R10: fffffbfff1282774 R11: ffffffff89413ba3 R12: ffff88806a7645c0
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88809f29ac00 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007fe8d0c58700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32823000 CR3: 00000000672eb000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 x25_new_lci net/x25/af_x25.c:357 [inline]
 x25_connect+0x374/0xdf0 net/x25/af_x25.c:786
 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1686
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1697 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1694 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1694
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e39
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fe8d0c57c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457e39
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe8d0c586d4
R13: 00000000004be378 R14: 00000000004ceb00 R15: 00000000ffffffff

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Andrew Hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-x25@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 24, 2019
commit fc8efd2 upstream.

LTP testcase mtest06 [1] can trigger a crash on s390x running 5.0.0-rc8.
This is a stress test, where one thread mmaps/writes/munmaps memory area
and other thread is trying to read from it:

  CPU: 0 PID: 2611 Comm: mmap1 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #51
  Hardware name: IBM 2964 N63 400 (z/VM 6.4.0)
  Krnl PSW : 0404e00180000000 00000000001ac8d8 (__lock_acquire+0x7/0x7a8)
  Call Trace:
  ([<0000000000000000>]           (null))
   [<00000000001adae4>] lock_acquire+0xec/0x258
   [<000000000080d1ac>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x5c/0x98
   [<000000000012a780>] page_table_free+0x48/0x1a8
   [<00000000002f6e54>] do_fault+0xdc/0x670
   [<00000000002fadae>] __handle_mm_fault+0x416/0x5f0
   [<00000000002fb138>] handle_mm_fault+0x1b0/0x320
   [<00000000001248cc>] do_dat_exception+0x19c/0x2c8
   [<000000000080e5ee>] pgm_check_handler+0x19e/0x200

page_table_free() is called with NULL mm parameter, but because "0" is a
valid address on s390 (see S390_lowcore), it keeps going until it
eventually crashes in lockdep's lock_acquire.  This crash is
reproducible at least since 4.14.

Problem is that "vmf->vma" used in do_fault() can become stale.  Because
mmap_sem may be released, other threads can come in, call munmap() and
cause "vma" be returned to kmem cache, and get zeroed/re-initialized and
re-used:

handle_mm_fault                           |
  __handle_mm_fault                       |
    do_fault                              |
      vma = vmf->vma                      |
      do_read_fault                       |
        __do_fault                        |
          vma->vm_ops->fault(vmf);        |
            mmap_sem is released          |
                                          |
                                          | do_munmap()
                                          |   remove_vma_list()
                                          |     remove_vma()
                                          |       vm_area_free()
                                          |         # vma is released
                                          | ...
                                          | # same vma is allocated
                                          | # from kmem cache
                                          | do_mmap()
                                          |   vm_area_alloc()
                                          |     memset(vma, 0, ...)
                                          |
      pte_free(vma->vm_mm, ...);          |
        page_table_free                   |
          spin_lock_bh(&mm->context.lock);|
            <crash>                       |

Cache mm_struct to avoid using potentially stale "vma".

[1] https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/mem/mtest06/mmap1.c

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5b3fdf19e2a5be460a384b936f5b56e13733f1b8.1551595137.git.jstancek@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 9, 2019
[ Upstream commit 4b4b077 ]

With architectures allowing the kernel to be placed almost arbitrarily
in memory (e.g.: ARM64), it is possible to have the kernel resides at
physical addresses above 4GB, resulting in neither the default CMA area,
nor the atomic pool from successfully allocating. This does not prevent
specific peripherals from working though, one example is XHCI, which
still operates correctly.

Trouble comes when the XHCI driver gets suspended and resumed, since we
can now trigger the following NPD:

[   12.664170] usb usb1: root hub lost power or was reset
[   12.669387] usb usb2: root hub lost power or was reset
[   12.674662] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000008
[   12.682896] pgd = ffffffc1365a7000
[   12.686386] [00000008] *pgd=0000000136500003, *pud=0000000136500003, *pmd=0000000000000000
[   12.694897] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] SMP
[   12.699843] Modules linked in:
[   12.702980] CPU: 0 PID: 1499 Comm: pml Not tainted 4.9.135-1.13pre #51
[   12.709577] Hardware name: BCM97268DV (DT)
[   12.713736] task: ffffffc136bb6540 task.stack: ffffffc1366cc000
[   12.719740] PC is at addr_in_gen_pool+0x4/0x48
[   12.724253] LR is at __dma_free+0x64/0xbc
[   12.728325] pc : [<ffffff80083c0df8>] lr : [<ffffff80080979e0>] pstate: 60000145
[   12.735825] sp : ffffffc1366cf990
[   12.739196] x29: ffffffc1366cf990 x28: ffffffc1366cc000
[   12.744608] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffffc13a8568c8
[   12.750020] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff80098f9000
[   12.755433] x23: 000000013a5ff000 x22: ffffff8009c57000
[   12.760844] x21: ffffffc13a856810 x20: 0000000000000000
[   12.766255] x19: 0000000000001000 x18: 000000000000000a
[   12.771667] x17: 0000007f917553e0 x16: 0000000000001002
[   12.777078] x15: 00000000000a36cb x14: ffffff80898feb77
[   12.782490] x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: 0000000000000030
[   12.787899] x11: 00000000fffffffe x10: ffffff80098feb7f
[   12.793311] x9 : 0000000005f5e0ff x8 : 65776f702074736f
[   12.798723] x7 : 6c2062756820746f x6 : ffffff80098febb1
[   12.804134] x5 : ffffff800809797c x4 : 0000000000000000
[   12.809545] x3 : 000000013a5ff000 x2 : 0000000000000fff
[   12.814955] x1 : ffffff8009c57000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[   12.820363]
[   12.821907] Process pml (pid: 1499, stack limit = 0xffffffc1366cc020)
[   12.828421] Stack: (0xffffffc1366cf990 to 0xffffffc1366d0000)
[   12.834240] f980:                                   ffffffc1366cf9e0 ffffff80086004d0
[   12.842186] f9a0: ffffffc13ab08238 0000000000000010 ffffff80097c2218 ffffffc13a856810
[   12.850131] f9c0: ffffff8009c57000 000000013a5ff000 0000000000000008 000000013a5ff000
[   12.858076] f9e0: ffffffc1366cfa50 ffffff80085f9250 ffffffc13ab08238 0000000000000004
[   12.866021] fa00: ffffffc13ab08000 ffffff80097b6000 ffffffc13ab08130 0000000000000001
[   12.873966] fa20: 0000000000000008 ffffffc13a8568c8 0000000000000000 ffffffc1366cc000
[   12.881911] fa40: ffffffc13ab08130 0000000000000001 ffffffc1366cfa90 ffffff80085e3de8
[   12.889856] fa60: ffffffc13ab08238 0000000000000000 ffffffc136b75b00 0000000000000000
[   12.897801] fa80: 0000000000000010 ffffff80089ccb92 ffffffc1366cfac0 ffffff80084ad040
[   12.905746] faa0: ffffffc13a856810 0000000000000000 ffffff80084ad004 ffffff80084b91a8
[   12.913691] fac0: ffffffc1366cfae0 ffffff80084b91b4 ffffffc13a856810 ffffff80080db5cc
[   12.921636] fae0: ffffffc1366cfb20 ffffff80084b96bc ffffffc13a856810 0000000000000010
[   12.929581] fb00: ffffffc13a856870 0000000000000000 ffffffc13a856810 ffffff800984d2b8
[   12.937526] fb20: ffffffc1366cfb50 ffffff80084baa70 ffffff8009932ad0 ffffff800984d260
[   12.945471] fb40: 0000000000000010 00000002eff0a065 ffffffc1366cfbb0 ffffff80084bafbc
[   12.953415] fb60: 0000000000000010 0000000000000003 ffffff80098fe000 0000000000000000
[   12.961360] fb80: ffffff80097b6000 ffffff80097b6dc8 ffffff80098c12b8 ffffff80098c12f8
[   12.969306] fba0: ffffff8008842000 ffffff80097b6dc8 ffffffc1366cfbd0 ffffff80080e0d88
[   12.977251] fbc0: 00000000fffffffb ffffff80080e10bc ffffffc1366cfc60 ffffff80080e16a8
[   12.985196] fbe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 ffffff80097b6000 ffffff80098fe9f0
[   12.993140] fc00: ffffff80097d4000 ffffff8008983802 0000000000000123 0000000000000040
[   13.001085] fc20: ffffff8008842000 ffffffc1366cc000 ffffff80089803c2 00000000ffffffff
[   13.009029] fc40: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffc1366cfc60 0000000000040987
[   13.016974] fc60: ffffffc1366cfcc0 ffffff80080dfd08 0000000000000003 0000000000000004
[   13.024919] fc80: 0000000000000003 ffffff80098fea08 ffffffc136577ec0 ffffff80089803c2
[   13.032864] fca0: 0000000000000123 0000000000000001 0000000500000002 0000000000040987
[   13.040809] fcc0: ffffffc1366cfd00 ffffff80083a89d4 0000000000000004 ffffffc136577ec0
[   13.048754] fce0: ffffffc136610cc0 ffffffffffffffea ffffffc1366cfeb0 ffffffc136610cd8
[   13.056700] fd00: ffffffc1366cfd10 ffffff800822a614 ffffffc1366cfd40 ffffff80082295d4
[   13.064645] fd20: 0000000000000004 ffffffc136577ec0 ffffffc136610cc0 0000000021670570
[   13.072590] fd40: ffffffc1366cfd80 ffffff80081b5d10 ffffff80097b6000 ffffffc13aae4200
[   13.080536] fd60: ffffffc1366cfeb0 0000000000000004 0000000021670570 0000000000000004
[   13.088481] fd80: ffffffc1366cfe30 ffffff80081b6b20 ffffffc13aae4200 0000000000000000
[   13.096427] fda0: 0000000000000004 0000000021670570 ffffffc1366cfeb0 ffffffc13a838200
[   13.104371] fdc0: 0000000000000000 000000000000000a ffffff80097b6000 0000000000040987
[   13.112316] fde0: ffffffc1366cfe20 ffffff80081b3af0 ffffffc13a838200 0000000000000000
[   13.120261] fe00: ffffffc1366cfe30 ffffff80081b6b0c ffffffc13aae4200 0000000000000000
[   13.128206] fe20: 0000000000000004 0000000000040987 ffffffc1366cfe70 ffffff80081b7dd8
[   13.136151] fe40: ffffff80097b6000 ffffffc13aae4200 ffffffc13aae4200 fffffffffffffff7
[   13.144096] fe60: 0000000021670570 ffffffc13a8c63c0 0000000000000000 ffffff8008083180
[   13.152042] fe80: ffffffffffffff1d 0000000021670570 ffffffffffffffff 0000007f917ad9b8
[   13.159986] fea0: 0000000020000000 0000000000000015 0000000000000000 0000000000040987
[   13.167930] fec0: 0000000000000001 0000000021670570 0000000000000004 0000000000000000
[   13.175874] fee0: 0000000000000888 0000440110000000 000000000000006d 0000000000000003
[   13.183819] ff00: 0000000000000040 ffffff80ffffffc8 0000000000000000 0000000000000020
[   13.191762] ff20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
[   13.199707] ff40: 0000000000000000 0000007f917553e0 0000000000000000 0000000000000004
[   13.207651] ff60: 0000000021670570 0000007f91835480 0000000000000004 0000007f91831638
[   13.215595] ff80: 0000000000000004 00000000004b0de0 00000000004b0000 0000000000000000
[   13.223539] ffa0: 0000000000000000 0000007fc92ac8c0 0000007f9175d178 0000007fc92ac8c0
[   13.231483] ffc0: 0000007f917ad9b8 0000000020000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000040
[   13.239427] ffe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[   13.247360] Call trace:
[   13.249866] Exception stack(0xffffffc1366cf7a0 to 0xffffffc1366cf8d0)
[   13.256386] f7a0: 0000000000001000 0000007fffffffff ffffffc1366cf990 ffffff80083c0df8
[   13.264331] f7c0: 0000000060000145 ffffff80089b5001 ffffffc13ab08130 0000000000000001
[   13.272275] f7e0: 0000000000000008 ffffffc13a8568c8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[   13.280220] f800: ffffffc1366cf960 ffffffc1366cf960 ffffffc1366cf930 00000000ffffffd8
[   13.288165] f820: ffffff8009931ac0 4554535953425553 4544006273753d4d 3831633d45434956
[   13.296110] f840: ffff003832313a39 ffffff800845926c ffffffc1366cf880 0000000000040987
[   13.304054] f860: 0000000000000000 ffffff8009c57000 0000000000000fff 000000013a5ff000
[   13.311999] f880: 0000000000000000 ffffff800809797c ffffff80098febb1 6c2062756820746f
[   13.319944] f8a0: 65776f702074736f 0000000005f5e0ff ffffff80098feb7f 00000000fffffffe
[   13.327884] f8c0: 0000000000000030 ffffffffffffffff
[   13.332835] [<ffffff80083c0df8>] addr_in_gen_pool+0x4/0x48
[   13.338398] [<ffffff80086004d0>] xhci_mem_cleanup+0xc8/0x51c
[   13.344137] [<ffffff80085f9250>] xhci_resume+0x308/0x65c
[   13.349524] [<ffffff80085e3de8>] xhci_brcm_resume+0x84/0x8c
[   13.355174] [<ffffff80084ad040>] platform_pm_resume+0x3c/0x64
[   13.360997] [<ffffff80084b91b4>] dpm_run_callback+0x5c/0x15c
[   13.366732] [<ffffff80084b96bc>] device_resume+0xc0/0x190
[   13.372205] [<ffffff80084baa70>] dpm_resume+0x144/0x2cc
[   13.377504] [<ffffff80084bafbc>] dpm_resume_end+0x20/0x34
[   13.382980] [<ffffff80080e0d88>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x104/0x704
[   13.389585] [<ffffff80080e16a8>] pm_suspend+0x320/0x53c
[   13.394881] [<ffffff80080dfd08>] state_store+0xbc/0xe0
[   13.400094] [<ffffff80083a89d4>] kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24
[   13.405655] [<ffffff800822a614>] sysfs_kf_write+0x60/0x70
[   13.411128] [<ffffff80082295d4>] kernfs_fop_write+0x130/0x194
[   13.416954] [<ffffff80081b5d10>] __vfs_write+0x60/0x150
[   13.422254] [<ffffff80081b6b20>] vfs_write+0xc8/0x164
[   13.427376] [<ffffff80081b7dd8>] SyS_write+0x70/0xc8
[   13.432412] [<ffffff8008083180>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
[   13.437800] Code: 92800173 97f6fb9e 17fffff5 d1000442 (f8408c03)
[   13.444033] ---[ end trace 2effe12f909ce205 ]---

The call path leading to this problem is xhci_mem_cleanup() ->
dma_free_coherent() -> dma_free_from_pool() -> addr_in_gen_pool. If the
atomic_pool is NULL, we can't possibly have the address in the atomic
pool anyway, so guard against that.

Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 25, 2020
[ Upstream commit 04d36d7 ]

The introduction of a split between the reference count on rxrpc_local
objects and the usage count didn't quite go far enough.  A number of kernel
work items need to make use of the socket to perform transmission.  These
also need to get an active count on the local object to prevent the socket
from being closed.

Fix this by getting the active count in those places.

Also split out the raw active count get/put functions as these places tend
to hold refs on the rxrpc_local object already, so getting and putting an
extra object ref is just a waste of time.

The problem can lead to symptoms like:

    BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
    ..
    CPU: 2 PID: 818 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 5.5.0-fscache+ #51
    ...
    RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x5/0x13
    ...
    Call Trace:
     security_socket_sendmsg+0x2c/0x3e
     sock_sendmsg+0x1a/0x46
     rxrpc_send_keepalive+0x131/0x1ae
     rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x219/0x34b
     process_one_work+0x18e/0x271
     worker_thread+0x1a3/0x247
     kthread+0xe6/0xeb
     ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fixes: 730c5fd ("rxrpc: Fix local endpoint refcounting")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
amboar pushed a commit to amboar/linux that referenced this issue Nov 26, 2020
[ Upstream commit 27dada0 ]

The defer ops code has been finishing items in the wrong order -- if a
top level defer op creates items A and B, and finishing item A creates
more defer ops A1 and A2, we'll put the new items on the end of the
chain and process them in the order A B A1 A2.  This is kind of weird,
since it's convenient for programmers to be able to think of A and B as
an ordered sequence where all the sub-tasks for A must finish before we
move on to B, e.g. A A1 A2 D.

Right now, our log intent items are not so complex that this matters,
but this will become important for the atomic extent swapping patchset.
In order to maintain correct reference counting of extents, we have to
unmap and remap extents in that order, and we want to complete that work
before moving on to the next range that the user wants to swap.  This
patch fixes defer ops to satsify that requirement.

The primary symptom of the incorrect order was noticed in an early
performance analysis of the atomic extent swap code.  An astonishingly
large number of deferred work items accumulated when userspace requested
an atomic update of two very fragmented files.  The cause of this was
traced to the same ordering bug in the inner loop of
xfs_defer_finish_noroll.

If the ->finish_item method of a deferred operation queues new deferred
operations, those new deferred ops are appended to the tail of the
pending work list.  To illustrate, say that a caller creates a
transaction t0 with four deferred operations D0-D3.  The first thing
defer ops does is roll the transaction to t1, leaving us with:

t1: D0(t0), D1(t0), D2(t0), D3(t0)

Let's say that finishing each of D0-D3 will create two new deferred ops.
After finish D0 and roll, we'll have the following chain:

t2: D1(t0), D2(t0), D3(t0), d4(t1), d5(t1)

d4 and d5 were logged to t1.  Notice that while we're about to start
work on D1, we haven't actually completed all the work implied by D0
being finished.  So far we've been careful (or lucky) to structure the
dfops callers such that D1 doesn't depend on d4 or d5 being finished,
but this is a potential logic bomb.

There's a second problem lurking.  Let's see what happens as we finish
D1-D3:

t3: D2(t0), D3(t0), d4(t1), d5(t1), d6(t2), d7(t2)
t4: D3(t0), d4(t1), d5(t1), d6(t2), d7(t2), d8(t3), d9(t3)
t5: d4(t1), d5(t1), d6(t2), d7(t2), d8(t3), d9(t3), d10(t4), d11(t4)

Let's say that d4-d11 are simple work items that don't queue any other
operations, which means that we can complete each d4 and roll to t6:

t6: d5(t1), d6(t2), d7(t2), d8(t3), d9(t3), d10(t4), d11(t4)
t7: d6(t2), d7(t2), d8(t3), d9(t3), d10(t4), d11(t4)
...
t11: d10(t4), d11(t4)
t12: d11(t4)
<done>

When we try to roll to transaction openbmc#12, we're holding defer op d11,
which we logged way back in t4.  This means that the tail of the log is
pinned at t4.  If the log is very small or there are a lot of other
threads updating metadata, this means that we might have wrapped the log
and cannot get roll to t11 because there isn't enough space left before
we'd run into t4.

Let's shift back to the original failure.  I mentioned before that I
discovered this flaw while developing the atomic file update code.  In
that scenario, we have a defer op (D0) that finds a range of file blocks
to remap, creates a handful of new defer ops to do that, and then asks
to be continued with however much work remains.

So, D0 is the original swapext deferred op.  The first thing defer ops
does is rolls to t1:

t1: D0(t0)

We try to finish D0, logging d1 and d2 in the process, but can't get all
the work done.  We log a done item and a new intent item for the work
that D0 still has to do, and roll to t2:

t2: D0'(t1), d1(t1), d2(t1)

We roll and try to finish D0', but still can't get all the work done, so
we log a done item and a new intent item for it, requeue D0 a second
time, and roll to t3:

t3: D0''(t2), d1(t1), d2(t1), d3(t2), d4(t2)

If it takes 48 more rolls to complete D0, then we'll finally dispense
with D0 in t50:

t50: D<fifty primes>(t49), d1(t1), ..., d102(t50)

We then try to roll again to get a chain like this:

t51: d1(t1), d2(t1), ..., d101(t50), d102(t50)
...
t152: d102(t50)
<done>

Notice that in rolling to transaction openbmc#51, we're holding on to a log
intent item for d1 that was logged in transaction openbmc#1.  This means that
the tail of the log is pinned at t1.  If the log is very small or there
are a lot of other threads updating metadata, this means that we might
have wrapped the log and cannot roll to t51 because there isn't enough
space left before we'd run into t1.  This is of course problem openbmc#2 again.

But notice the third problem with this scenario: we have 102 defer ops
tied to this transaction!  Each of these items are backed by pinned
kernel memory, which means that we risk OOM if the chains get too long.

Yikes.  Problem openbmc#1 is a subtle logic bomb that could hit someone in the
future; problem openbmc#2 applies (rarely) to the current upstream, and problem
openbmc#3 applies to work under development.

This is not how incremental deferred operations were supposed to work.
The dfops design of logging in the same transaction an intent-done item
and a new intent item for the work remaining was to make it so that we
only have to juggle enough deferred work items to finish that one small
piece of work.  Deferred log item recovery will find that first
unfinished work item and restart it, no matter how many other intent
items might follow it in the log.  Therefore, it's ok to put the new
intents at the start of the dfops chain.

For the first example, the chains look like this:

t2: d4(t1), d5(t1), D1(t0), D2(t0), D3(t0)
t3: d5(t1), D1(t0), D2(t0), D3(t0)
...
t9: d9(t7), D3(t0)
t10: D3(t0)
t11: d10(t10), d11(t10)
t12: d11(t10)

For the second example, the chains look like this:

t1: D0(t0)
t2: d1(t1), d2(t1), D0'(t1)
t3: d2(t1), D0'(t1)
t4: D0'(t1)
t5: d1(t4), d2(t4), D0''(t4)
...
t148: D0<50 primes>(t147)
t149: d101(t148), d102(t148)
t150: d102(t148)
<done>

This actually sucks more for pinning the log tail (we try to roll to t10
while holding an intent item that was logged in t1) but we've solved
problem openbmc#1.  We've also reduced the maximum chain length from:

    sum(all the new items) + nr_original_items

to:

    max(new items that each original item creates) + nr_original_items

This solves problem openbmc#3 by sharply reducing the number of defer ops that
can be attached to a transaction at any given time.  The change makes
the problem of log tail pinning worse, but is improvement we need to
solve problem openbmc#2.  Actually solving openbmc#2, however, is left to the next
patch.

Note that a subsequent analysis of some hard-to-trigger reflink and COW
livelocks on extremely fragmented filesystems (or systems running a lot
of IO threads) showed the same symptoms -- uncomfortably large numbers
of incore deferred work items and occasional stalls in the transaction
grant code while waiting for log reservations.  I think this patch and
the next one will also solve these problems.

As originally written, the code used list_splice_tail_init instead of
list_splice_init, so change that, and leave a short comment explaining
our actions.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
amboar pushed a commit to amboar/linux that referenced this issue Nov 26, 2020
commit 8062426 upstream.

With LOCKDEP enabled, CTI driver triggers the following splat due
to uninitialized lock class for dynamically allocated attribute
objects.

[    5.372901] coresight etm0: CPU0: ETM v4.0 initialized
[    5.376694] coresight etm1: CPU1: ETM v4.0 initialized
[    5.380785] coresight etm2: CPU2: ETM v4.0 initialized
[    5.385851] coresight etm3: CPU3: ETM v4.0 initialized
[    5.389808] BUG: key ffff00000564a798 has not been registered!
[    5.392456] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    5.398195] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1)
[    5.398233] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 32 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4623 lockdep_init_map_waits+0x14c/0x260
[    5.406149] Modules linked in:
[    5.415411] CPU: 1 PID: 32 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 5.9.0-12034-gbbe85027ce80 openbmc#51
[    5.418553] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. APQ 8016 SBC (DT)
[    5.426453] Workqueue: events amba_deferred_retry_func
[    5.433299] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[    5.438252] pc : lockdep_init_map_waits+0x14c/0x260
[    5.444410] lr : lockdep_init_map_waits+0x14c/0x260
[    5.449007] sp : ffff800012bbb720
...

[    5.531561] Call trace:
[    5.536847]  lockdep_init_map_waits+0x14c/0x260
[    5.539027]  __kernfs_create_file+0xa8/0x1c8
[    5.543539]  sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0xd0/0x208
[    5.548054]  internal_create_group+0x118/0x3c8
[    5.552307]  internal_create_groups+0x58/0xb8
[    5.556733]  sysfs_create_groups+0x2c/0x38
[    5.561160]  device_add+0x2d8/0x768
[    5.565148]  device_register+0x28/0x38
[    5.568537]  coresight_register+0xf8/0x320
[    5.572358]  cti_probe+0x1b0/0x3f0

...

Fix this by initializing the attributes when they are allocated.

Fixes: 3c5597e ("coresight: cti: Add connection information to sysfs")
Reported-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029164559.1268531-2-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 24, 2021
[ Upstream commit d5027ca ]

Ritesh reported a bug [1] against UML, noting that it crashed on
startup. The backtrace shows the following (heavily redacted):

(gdb) bt
...
 #26 0x0000000060015b5d in sem_init () at ipc/sem.c:268
 #27 0x00007f89906d92f7 in ?? () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcom_err.so.2
 #28 0x00007f8990ab8fb2 in call_init (...) at dl-init.c:72
...
 #40 0x00007f89909bf3a6 in nss_load_library (...) at nsswitch.c:359
...
 #44 0x00007f8990895e35 in _nss_compat_getgrnam_r (...) at nss_compat/compat-grp.c:486
 #45 0x00007f8990968b85 in __getgrnam_r [...]
 #46 0x00007f89909d6b77 in grantpt [...]
 #47 0x00007f8990a9394e in __GI_openpty [...]
 #48 0x00000000604a1f65 in openpty_cb (...) at arch/um/os-Linux/sigio.c:407
 #49 0x00000000604a58d0 in start_idle_thread (...) at arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c:598
 #50 0x0000000060004a3d in start_uml () at arch/um/kernel/skas/process.c:45
 #51 0x00000000600047b2 in linux_main (...) at arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c:334
 #52 0x000000006000574f in main (...) at arch/um/os-Linux/main.c:144

indicating that the UML function openpty_cb() calls openpty(),
which internally calls __getgrnam_r(), which causes the nsswitch
machinery to get started.

This loads, through lots of indirection that I snipped, the
libcom_err.so.2 library, which (in an unknown function, "??")
calls sem_init().

Now, of course it wants to get libpthread's sem_init(), since
it's linked against libpthread. However, the dynamic linker
looks up that symbol against the binary first, and gets the
kernel's sem_init().

Hajime Tazaki noted that "objcopy -L" can localize a symbol,
so the dynamic linker wouldn't do the lookup this way. I tried,
but for some reason that didn't seem to work.

Doing the same thing in the linker script instead does seem to
work, though I cannot entirely explain - it *also* works if I
just add "VERSION { { global: *; }; }" instead, indicating that
something else is happening that I don't really understand. It
may be that explicitly doing that marks them with some kind of
empty version, and that's different from the default.

Explicitly marking them with a version breaks kallsyms, so that
doesn't seem to be possible.

Marking all the symbols as local seems correct, and does seem
to address the issue, so do that. Also do it for static link,
nsswitch libraries could still be loaded there.

[1] https://bugs.debian.org/983379

Reported-by: Ritesh Raj Sarraf <rrs@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-By: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Tested-By: Ritesh Raj Sarraf <rrs@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
shenki pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 11, 2021
[ Upstream commit b9edbfe ]

Commit 3df98d7 ("lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi
to the LSM hooks") introduced flowi{4,6}_to_flowi_common() functions which
cause UBSAN warning when building with LLVM 11.0.1 on Ubuntu 21.04.

 ================================================================================
 UBSAN: object-size-mismatch in ./include/net/flow.h:197:33
 member access within address ffffc9000109fbd8 with insufficient space
 for an object of type 'struct flowi'
 CPU: 2 PID: 7410 Comm: systemd-resolve Not tainted 5.14.0 #51
 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x103/0x171
  ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0x1de/0x390
  __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x41/0x50
  udp_sendmsg+0xda2/0x1300
  ? ip_skb_dst_mtu+0x1f0/0x1f0
  ? sock_rps_record_flow+0xe/0x200
  ? inet_send_prepare+0x2d/0x90
  sock_sendmsg+0x49/0x80
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x370
  __sys_sendmsg+0x15e/0x1d0
  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0xf0/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f7081a50497
 Code: 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc153870f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007f7081a50497
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc15387140 RDI: 000000000000000c
 RBP: 00007ffc15387140 R08: 0000563f29a5e4fc R09: 000000000000cd28
 R10: 0000563f29a68a30 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c
 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000563f29a68a30 R15: 0000563f29a5e50c
 ================================================================================

I don't think we need to call flowi{4,6}_to_flowi() from these functions
because the first member of "struct flowi4" and "struct flowi6" is

  struct flowi_common __fl_common;

while the first member of "struct flowi" is

  union {
    struct flowi_common __fl_common;
    struct flowi4       ip4;
    struct flowi6       ip6;
    struct flowidn      dn;
  } u;

which should point to the same address without access to "struct flowi".

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
amboar pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 11, 2024
[ Upstream commit 5d47ec2 ]

The `cls_redirect` test triggers a kernel panic like:

  # ./test_progs -t cls_redirect
  Can't find bpf_testmod.ko kernel module: -2
  WARNING! Selftests relying on bpf_testmod.ko will be skipped.
  [   30.938489] CPU 3 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffffffd814de0, era == ffff800002009fb8, ra == ffff800002009f9c
  [   30.939331] Oops[#1]:
  [   30.939513] CPU: 3 PID: 1260 Comm: test_progs Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-loong-devel-g2f56bb0d2327 #35 a896aca3f4164f09cc346f89f2e09832e07be5f6
  [   30.939732] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
  [   30.939901] pc ffff800002009fb8 ra ffff800002009f9c tp 9000000104da4000 sp 9000000104da7ab0
  [   30.940038] a0 fffffffffd814de0 a1 9000000104da7a68 a2 0000000000000000 a3 9000000104da7c10
  [   30.940183] a4 9000000104da7c14 a5 0000000000000002 a6 0000000000000021 a7 00005555904d7f90
  [   30.940321] t0 0000000000000110 t1 0000000000000000 t2 fffffffffd814de0 t3 0004c4b400000000
  [   30.940456] t4 ffffffffffffffff t5 00000000c3f63600 t6 0000000000000000 t7 0000000000000000
  [   30.940590] t8 000000000006d803 u0 0000000000000020 s9 9000000104da7b10 s0 900000010504c200
  [   30.940727] s1 fffffffffd814de0 s2 900000010504c200 s3 9000000104da7c10 s4 9000000104da7ad0
  [   30.940866] s5 0000000000000000 s6 90000000030e65bc s7 9000000104da7b44 s8 90000000044f6fc0
  [   30.941015]    ra: ffff800002009f9c bpf_prog_846803e5ae81417f_cls_redirect+0xa0/0x590
  [   30.941535]   ERA: ffff800002009fb8 bpf_prog_846803e5ae81417f_cls_redirect+0xbc/0x590
  [   30.941696]  CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
  [   30.942224]  PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
  [   30.942330]  EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE)
  [   30.942453]  ECFG: 00071c1c (LIE=2-4,10-12 VS=7)
  [   30.942612] ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0)
  [   30.942764]  BADV: fffffffffd814de0
  [   30.942854]  PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000)
  [   30.942974] Modules linked in:
  [   30.943078] Process test_progs (pid: 1260, threadinfo=00000000ce303226, task=000000007d10bb76)
  [   30.943306] Stack : 900000010a064000 90000000044f6fc0 9000000104da7b48 0000000000000000
  [   30.943495]         0000000000000000 9000000104da7c14 9000000104da7c10 900000010504c200
  [   30.943626]         0000000000000001 ffff80001b88c000 9000000104da7b70 90000000030e6668
  [   30.943785]         0000000000000000 9000000104da7b58 ffff80001b88c048 9000000003d05000
  [   30.943936]         900000000303ac88 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000104da7b70
  [   30.944091]         0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000731eeab00 0000000000000000
  [   30.944245]         ffff80001b88c000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 54b99959429f83b8
  [   30.944402]         ffff80001b88c000 90000000044f6fc0 9000000101d70000 ffff80001b88c000
  [   30.944538]         000000000000005a 900000010504c200 900000010a064000 900000010a067000
  [   30.944697]         9000000104da7d88 0000000000000000 9000000003d05000 90000000030e794c
  [   30.944852]         ...
  [   30.944924] Call Trace:
  [   30.945120] [<ffff800002009fb8>] bpf_prog_846803e5ae81417f_cls_redirect+0xbc/0x590
  [   30.945650] [<90000000030e6668>] bpf_test_run+0x1ec/0x2f8
  [   30.945958] [<90000000030e794c>] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x31c/0x684
  [   30.946065] [<90000000026d4f68>] __sys_bpf+0x678/0x2724
  [   30.946159] [<90000000026d7288>] sys_bpf+0x20/0x2c
  [   30.946253] [<90000000032dd224>] do_syscall+0x7c/0x94
  [   30.946343] [<9000000002541c5c>] handle_syscall+0xbc/0x158
  [   30.946492]
  [   30.946549] Code: 0015030e  5c0009c0  5001d000 <28c00304> 02c00484  29c00304  00150009  2a42d2e4  0280200d
  [   30.946793]
  [   30.946971] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [   32.093225] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
  [   32.093526] Kernel relocated by 0x2320000
  [   32.093630]  .text @ 0x9000000002520000
  [   32.093725]  .data @ 0x9000000003400000
  [   32.093792]  .bss  @ 0x9000000004413200
  [   34.971998] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

This is because we signed-extend function return values. When subprog
mode is enabled, we have:

  cls_redirect()
    -> get_global_metrics() returns pcpu ptr 0xfffffefffc00b480

The pointer returned is later signed-extended to 0xfffffffffc00b480 at
`BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT`. During BPF prog run, this triggers unhandled page
fault and a kernel panic.

Drop the unnecessary signed-extension on return values like other
architectures do.

With this change, we have:

  # ./test_progs -t cls_redirect
  Can't find bpf_testmod.ko kernel module: -2
  WARNING! Selftests relying on bpf_testmod.ko will be skipped.
  #51/1    cls_redirect/cls_redirect_inlined:OK
  #51/2    cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: SYN):OK
  #51/3    cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: SYN):OK
  #51/4    cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/5    cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/6    cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP forward unknown (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/7    cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP forward unknown (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/8    cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept known (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/9    cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept known (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/10   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP accept unknown (no hops, flags: none):OK
  #51/11   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP accept unknown (no hops, flags: none):OK
  #51/12   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP forward unknown (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/13   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP forward unknown (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/14   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP accept known (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/15   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP accept known (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/16   cls_redirect/cls_redirect_subprogs:OK
  #51/17   cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: SYN):OK
  #51/18   cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: SYN):OK
  #51/19   cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/20   cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/21   cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP forward unknown (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/22   cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP forward unknown (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/23   cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept known (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/24   cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept known (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/25   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP accept unknown (no hops, flags: none):OK
  #51/26   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP accept unknown (no hops, flags: none):OK
  #51/27   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP forward unknown (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/28   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP forward unknown (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/29   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP accept known (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/30   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP accept known (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/31   cls_redirect/cls_redirect_dynptr:OK
  #51/32   cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: SYN):OK
  #51/33   cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: SYN):OK
  #51/34   cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/35   cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept unknown (no hops, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/36   cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP forward unknown (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/37   cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP forward unknown (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/38   cls_redirect/IPv4 TCP accept known (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/39   cls_redirect/IPv6 TCP accept known (one hop, flags: ACK):OK
  #51/40   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP accept unknown (no hops, flags: none):OK
  #51/41   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP accept unknown (no hops, flags: none):OK
  #51/42   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP forward unknown (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/43   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP forward unknown (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/44   cls_redirect/IPv4 UDP accept known (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51/45   cls_redirect/IPv6 UDP accept known (one hop, flags: none):OK
  #51      cls_redirect:OK
  Summary: 1/45 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Fixes: 5dc6155 ("LoongArch: Add BPF JIT support")
Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
amboar pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 11, 2024
[ Upstream commit 9dbe086 ]

A crash was found when dumping SMC-R connections. It can be reproduced
by following steps:

- environment: two RNICs on both sides.
- run SMC-R between two sides, now a SMC_LGR_SYMMETRIC type link group
  will be created.
- set the first RNIC down on either side and link group will turn to
  SMC_LGR_ASYMMETRIC_LOCAL then.
- run 'smcss -R' and the crash will be triggered.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 8000000101fdd067 P4D 8000000101fdd067 PUD 10ce46067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 3 PID: 1810 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W   E      6.7.0-rc6+ #51
 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x36e/0x620 [smc_diag]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x24/0x70
  ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
  ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x36e/0x620 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
  netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
  __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
  smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
  ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
  ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
  netlink_sendmsg+0x240/0x4a0
  __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
  ? __do_fault+0x34/0x1a0
  ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
  ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
  __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

When the first RNIC is set down, the lgr->lnk[0] will be cleared and an
asymmetric link will be allocated in lgr->link[SMC_LINKS_PER_LGR_MAX - 1]
by smc_llc_alloc_alt_link(). Then when we try to dump SMC-R connections
in __smc_diag_dump(), the invalid lgr->lnk[0] will be accessed, resulting
in this issue. So fix it by accessing the right link.

Fixes: f16a7dd ("smc: netlink interface for SMC sockets")
Reported-by: henaumars <henaumars@sina.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=7616
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1703662835-53416-1-git-send-email-guwen@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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