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Minutes 2021-04-28 #209

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May 5, 2021
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# 2021-04-28 Solid Authorization

* [Meeting](https://meet.jit.si/solid-authorization)
* [Chat](https://gitter.im/solid/authorization-panel?at=6088092ac1a9210b3c23a55a)
* [Notes](https://hackmd.io/mFgvpYMZR7Co_DIDgUaNwA)

## Agenda

* Minutes https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/pull/207
* Cleanup minutes: standard filename and extension https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/pull/208
* Add issue template https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/pull/205
* Commit [PR 201](https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/pull/201)?
* AnyOf, AllOf, etc...


## Present

* Justin Bingham
* Eric Prud'hommeaux
* Henry Story
* Matthieu Bosquet
* Sarven Capadisli


## Minutes

1. Commited Meeting Cleanups
2. Appropve minutes from 207 without the ACP code discused in the last few minutes in the last call
3. Elf Accept changed and then Commit on PR 205
4. Merged 201


## ACP apply policy algorithm

**Henry**: Last week, we discussed a PR I made to
[the wac-acp-diff story](https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/blob/main/proposals/wac-acp-diff-story.md) which we just committed.
We looked at how the ACL ontology allows a behavior similar to ACP by creating an inferred `:authorizes` relation
defined as:

```Turtle
:authorizes owl:inverseOf [
owl:propertyChainAxiom(:accessControl acl:accessTo)
]
```
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@bblfish I'm not sure you can assert the statement that is part of the object property chain.

If:

SubObjectPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :hasFather :hasBrother ) :hasUncle ) 

:x :hasFather :y .
:y :hasBrother :z .
# Then
:x :hasUncle :z .

However, I don't think (and didn't find example of in the OWL 2 syntax of) infering the property chain predicate. And I think it is deliberate (I might be wrong).
Let's imagine for a second that:

:x :hasFather :y .
:x :hasUncle :z .
# It could be that:
:x :hasMother :w .
:w :hasBrother :z .
# And then
SubObjectPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :hasMother :hasBrother ) :hasUncle ) 
# Therefore
:x :hasUncle :z .
# (but :y :does_not_have_brother :z)

So just to confirm, the following axiom is incorrect:

:authorizes owl:inverseOf [
    owl:propertyChainAxiom(acl:accessControl acl:accessTo)
]

Instead what we're proposing to assert here is the acl:accessTo relationship via the following axiom:

acl:accessTo owl:inverseOf [
        owl:propertyChainAxiom ( acl:accessControl :authorizes )
      ] .

(which relies on the not yet existing :authorizes predicate).
Is this correct?

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For those following here, I recommend looking at the OWL 2 Primer §Property Chain section. You can get the Turtle version of each code snippet if you go to the top of the page and click a "Turtle Syntax" button. That will give you the definition for :hasGrandparent in Turtle as:

:hasGrandparent  owl:propertyChainAxiom  ( :hasParent  :hasParent ) .

(It is annoying that one cannot pass that decision around as a URL and I sent a mail to the semantic-web mailing list reporting that.)

We also have the definition given in OWL2 RDF Based Semantics.

I was working with this picture in mind:

But I wrote it out too quickly and got the order of the relations wrong.

:authorizes owl:inverseOf [
    owl:propertyChainAxiom  (acl:accessTo :accessControl )
]

But it is still a good question whether even that is correct.
And indeed the following does not look right:

counterexample

I can follow the :accessTo link from <fake.acl> follow the :accessControl relation from there and that does not give me the :authorizes link that gives Control rights I started off with.

So yes, I should go back to the original proposal I made:

acl:accessTo owl:inverseOf [
        owl:propertyChainAxiom ( acl:accessControl :authorizes )
      ] .

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The above is a very good example of why we want to build on formally specified languages such as OWL, as it allows one to make precise arguments as @matthieubosquet just made above.

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I can follow the :accessTo link from <fake.acl> follow the :accessControl relation from there and that does not give me the :authorizes link that gives Control rights I started off with.

I'm not sure I see why the :authorizes statement cannot be inferred using that graph and the previous axiom.

# If
ex:authorization1 acl:accessTo ex:resource .
ex:resource acl:accessControl <card.acl> .
# Then
<card.acl> :authorizes ex:authorization1 .
# Could we not also say
<fake.acl#authorization2> acl:accessTo ex:resource .
# Therefore
<card.acl> :authorizes <fake.acl#authorization2> .
# ?

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If I understand you correctly you have this picture in mind, where I have labelled the nodes.
The mapping from your code is
ex:authorization1 -> a1
ex:resource -> r
<fake.acl#authorization2> -> a2

my picture of mattieux's triples above

So I was trying to say that with the improved but still rejected rule

:authorizes owl:inverseOf [
    owl:propertyChainAxiom  (acl:accessTo :accessControl )
]

we then get (inferred) the red dotted line representing <card.acl#> :authorizes <fake.acl#a2> which is not what is desired.
That would make it easy to create fake authorizations.

But that no longer follows from the rule originally proposed

acl:accessTo owl:inverseOf [
        owl:propertyChainAxiom ( acl:accessControl :authorizes )
      ] .

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Thanks Henry, that makes sense. So, to summarize:

  • The axiom allowing inference of the acl:accessTo statement seems safe
  • The axiom allowing inference of the acl:authorizes statement is not safe because it introduces a problem in controlling the boundaries of the authorization graph applying to a resource X.

Given a set of server managed statements (by that I mean statements that "lawfully" belong in the authorization graph or in other words, assuming that the statements in the form :x acl:accessTo :y . are all part of the authorization graph and apply to the resource already), the acl:authorizes inferrence axiom could be used.

Therefore, it seems unlikely the axiom for inferring acl:authorizes could be used in production to maintain a compatibility layer, it may in certain circumstances be used to migrate from one authorization system to the other.

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Ah, thanks. What I thought was a mistake might have a use after all!

So yes, to first address your second bullet point, the rule for inferring :authorizes

:authorizes owl:inverseOf [
    owl:propertyChainAxiom  (acl:accessTo :accessControl )
]

could be used by new clients (ACP, WAC+, whatever...) on existing deployments. Or at least it allows us to see how existing deployments fit in with the proposal for an :authorizes relation.
Existing deployments do not show the :authorizes relation, but it is as if there always had been one such relation from the document to each Authorization. I.e. they could infer the blue dotted lines below.

Current ACL with :authorizes inferencing

But as shown in our previous comment, it is essential for the Authorization nodes to appear inside the document linked to by the acl:accessControl header. So there has to be some context around the :authorizes rule above that makes that clear. That could be done in N3, and perhaps there is a better construct than propertyChainAxiom to express it.

To your first bullet point, the rule for accessTo is on the other hand completely general.

acl:accessTo owl:inverseOf [
        owl:propertyChainAxiom ( acl:accessControl :authorizes )
      ] .

It can be used to help clients written for the acl ontology to continue making sense of servers producing ACP, WAC+ or whatever we come up with, by injecting the new acl:accessTo triple in the Graph before the UI ACL code gets to run, as illustrated in issue 184.

In any case both of these rules help show how the two systems relate, and increase our understanding of what is going on.

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Henry, out of curiosity, what do you use for those graphs?
It's quite handy and you seem very quick to make them.

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I have been using Omnigraffle for close to 16 years now.
(I am not sure if there are new better tools out there)


This relation, which is already implicit in ACL, as it can be defined purely in terms of those concepts, allows one to get similar behavior to the one put forward as the distinguishing feature of ACP.
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We then looked at the ShEx examples and showed that with a very simple inferencing step -- adding one
triple to the graph after following an `:accessControl` `Link` header relation -- one could even apply that WAC ShEx to that graph and get clients written to the old ACL ontology to continue working.

But the question then was what do the `allOf`, `anyOf`, `noneOf` and `apply*` relations bring to the picture. How do they work?

We were about to start on that when time ran out.
We had just pasted this code into the chat.

```typescript
/**
* # The apply policy algorithm
*
* A policy is applied if:
* - At least one matcher it uses matches the given context; and
* - All the conditions it defines are satisfied.
*
* Policy conditions behave like intersection, union and exclusion operators. In
* order to be satisfied:
* - allOf requires all of its matchers to match the given context;
* - anyOf requires one of its matchers to match the given context;
* - noneOf requires none of its matchers to match the given context.
*
* Note: Given that the noneOf condition excludes matches, a policy without a
* satisfied allOf or anyOf condition never applies.
*
* @param policy The policy to evaluate
* @param context The context in which the policy is evaluated
* @returns True if the policy applies, false otherwise
*/
export function applyPolicy(policy: IPolicy, context: IContext): boolean {
const matchContext = (matcher: IMatcher) => {
return matcher.match(context);
};

// A policy without positive match doesn't apply
if (policy.allOf.length + policy.anyOf.length === 0) {
return false;
}

return (
(policy.allOf.length === 0 || policy.allOf.every(matchContext)) &&
(policy.anyOf.length === 0 || policy.anyOf.some(matchContext)) &&
(policy.noneOf.length === 0 || !policy.noneOf.some(matchContext))
);
}
```

**Henry**: before we look at that code, can we look at some simple RDF examples of a policy using that vocabulary?

**Mattieu**
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Yes, I can write it out here.

```Turtle
prefix ex: <https://example.com/>

ex:PolicyX
acp:allow acl:Read ; # would only having acp:allow acl:Read imply anything other than Read? Why would acp:deny be necessary?
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acp:deny acl:Write ;
acp:allOf ex:AgentMatcher1, ex:IssuerMatcher1, ex:TimeMatcher1, ex:CredentialIssueTimeMatcher1 .

ex:AgentMatcher1
acp:agent ex:Bob, ex:Alice .

ex:IssuerMatcher1
acp:issuer ex:IdP1 .

ex:TimeMatcher1
acp:time [
some owl time range e.g. sunday 10am to 2pm
]
```

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Here the Policy X will apply if all the matchers are satisfied in the current context.
A context would be the description of a resource access. (note: We have `acp:deny` which is new compared to WAC.)

So a Policy is what gives access to a resource.
With the above context, Bob is allowed to read a resource.
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```turtle
ex:ResourceAccess1
acp:time "2021-04-26T15:30:00Z" ;
acp:agent ex:Bob ;
acp:issuer ex:IdP1 ;
acp:resource ex:MyResource1 .
```

**Henry**
Note: it looks like `acp:resource` is equivalent to `acl:accessTo`.
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**Henry** :

So we can get the equivalent of `allOf` with `owl:intersectionOf`
For example, one can describe EU Citizens over 18 if one has already defined two groups, one the set of Citizens and the other of being over18 as here:

```Turtle
@prefix owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> .

<#EUOver18> owl:equivalentClass [
owl:intersectionOf ( eu:Citizen iso:Over18 )
].
```

**Matthieu**

ACP `someOf` is the union of the sets described by all matchers.

```turtle
prefix ex: <https://example.com/>

ex:PolicyY
acp:allow acl:Read ;
acp:someOf ex:AgentMatcherFriends1, ex:AgentMatcherFamily1 .

ex:AgentMatcherFriends1
acp:agent ex:Henry, ex:Jay .

ex:AgentMatcherFamily1
acp:agent ex:Bob, ex:Alice .
```

This Policy will apply if you are any of the agents defined by AgentMatcherFriends1 and AgentMatcherFamily1.


**Henry**

Note that one can get that with `owl:unionOf`

```Turtle
<#EUOrOver18> owl:equivalentClass [
owl:unionOf ( eu:Citizen iso:Over18 )
] .
```

This gives us the set of citizens over18 or those that are European Union Citizens.

The range of `acp:allow` is a set of agents right?

**Matthieu** : It is more than that: it can be selecting credentials, issuers and times too.

Access to a resource based on credentials. For example, giving access to those over 18.
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```turtle
ex:resource
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ex:PolicyVC
acp:allow acl:Read ;
acp:allOf ex:VCMatcher1 .

ex:VCMatcher1
rdfs:label "Over 18 VC Matcher" ;
acp:vc ex:over18 .
```

**Henry**: Is it not selecting sets of agents that have certain relations to credential issuers, times, birth dates, capabilities (e.g. the ability to drive) etc...?
This is what Description Logic allows one to do: define sets of things by describing their relations to other things? That is: we can get
the same effect by using descriptions to constrain the set of agents in the `acl:agentClass` relation.

Here are a few examples I put together over the past few months in various issues:

From [Issue 135: OWL for anyOf, allOf, noneOf?](https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/issues/135)
One can model a class minus another, giving us the equivalent of deny perhaps

```Turtle
<#Responsible> owl:equivalentClass [
owl:intersectionOf ( iso:Over18 [ owl:complementOf <g0#Trolls> ] )
]
```

In [issue 147](https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/issues/147#issuecomment-743158893) I show how one can describe people over 21

```Turtle
<#PersonOver21> owl:equivalentClass [ a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty :hasAge ;
owl:someValuesFrom
[ rdf:type rdfs:Datatype ;
owl:onDatatype xsd:integer ;
owl:withRestrictions ( [ xsd:minExclusive 21 ] [ xsd:maxInclusive 150 ] )
]
].
```

This example is taken directly from the OWL spec btw.
Here again, we describe a set of agents by their relation to some other thing (an age).
And in [issue 176: Only Trust Certain issuers of Identity](https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/issues/176) I put together an example that creates a subclass of agents, restricted to those that have credentials issued by certain trusted issuers:

```Turtle
<verified#agents> rdf:type owl:Class ;
owl:equivalentClass [
rdf:type owl:Restriction ;
owl:onProperty wac:hasCredentialIssuer ;
owl:someValuesFrom <trusted#issuers> .
] .
```

So we only need a relation of a Policy or Access control Rule to a set of agents.
We can then specify what that set of agents is.

```Turtle
<> :authorizes [
a acl:Authorization;
acl:agentClass </grps/verified#agents>; # Authenticated Agents from verified issuers
acl:mode acl:Read, acl:Write # has Read/Write access to the collection
].
```

This gives us the same properties as `allOf`, `anyOf`, `noneOf` relations it seems.
Perhaps then `allOf`, `anyOf`, `noneOf` can be mapped to OWL.
Writing up such a mapping would allow us to leverage well-known, widely researched and deployed standards in what we are doing.

So we see that we can certainly both define the restrictions on the set of agents using ACL or extensions thereof (in the ACP namespace, why not?).

## Flow from Resource to Policy

But there are a few other relations I have been wondering about.
Perhaps we can go back to the beginning so that I can make sure I follow the path from the access-controlled resource.

**Matthieu**

Certainly, we can start with the relation from LDPR to the Access control resource with the following relation, via the header:

```turtle
<mydoc> acp:accessControl <mydoc.acp#> .
```

The ACR doc contains a policy X mandating access over the resource controlled by <#>.

```Turtle
<#> acp:apply ex:PolicyX .
```

**Henry**: this looks very much like `:authorizes` relation defined in
[issue 184](https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/issues/184)
which we discussed last week.

The `apply` name is not very clear, perhaps because it is so general. (In functional programming and Category Theory it is used for all applications of arguments to a function). I found this makes its
role difficult to understand. That explains perhaps why I could not work out how it fits into [wac-acp diff](https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/blob/main/proposals/acp/wac-acp-diff.ttl).
So I find it helps to see that it is playing the role of `acp:authorizes`.
I had not understood that.

But there is also another set of relations named `access*` if I remember correctly.
Why do we need all of those?

**Matthieu**:

This is useful when the ACR doc contains another policy Y mandating access over itself (<>).


```Turtle
<#>
acp:access ex:PolicyY .
acp:applyProtected ex:ProtectedAccessControl1 .
```

**Henry**:

So that is specifying what rights we have to access the ACR itself?
Why not reuse the same `acp:accessControl` mentioned at the beginning?

**Matthieu**: Indeed `acp:access` is very similar to that.
But it helps avoid infinite recursion in case clike this:
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```turtle
ex:resource1 acp:access ex:acr1 .
ex:acr1 acp:access ex:acr2 .
ex:acr2 acp:access ex:acr3 .
```

**Henry**: I am not sure that actually is a problem. It would need to
be argued for carefully.
I have not found there to be a problem when a resource claims to be its own ACR.
(And recursion is not problematic if it has a fixed point. Functional programming relies on that.)

There is a fundamental distinction in philosophy between Epistemology (what you know) versus ontology (how things are) that can help us here.
We can see the ACL ontology as telling us that every resource on the web has access control rules.
And indeed, they do: most web pages cannot be written to by just anyone. Even places like Wikipedia that allow wide-open contributions can limit access. So if I had full *knowledge* of the access control state of a website, I could write out a document describing all resources there and who had access.
So we can think of those statements as not being published at present, but as potentially publisheablle.
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Indeed those statements are written somewhere: in some binary or textual form, Apache config files, databases, XML documents, ... and could be given an RDF representation.
All publishing the ACRs is doing is allowing a client to "know" what the rules of access are (epistemology).
At present browsers don't have access to the policies,
and humans have to work those out by reading text and filling in forms.

In short: there is no difference ontologically that one can make between ACRs and other resources -- all resources have access control rules, even access control rule resources.

So, in that case, why build up a new type of relation, when we already have what we need? It seems furthermore that this complicates things: instead of 1 `acp:accessControl` relation you now have 4 or so more.

## Discussion on Resource restrictions

**Henry**

I was wondering how in ACP one restricts policies to sets of resources?
If I remember correctly, EricP had a use case for the transitive closure of resources he needed for a health care example.

**EricP**

Diagnosis > Conditions > Observations

Access inheritance via specific paths.

Condition 456 -> Observation 789 ->


Henry: How do you describe sets of resources that have a set of properties in addition to describing agents that have sets of properties? And how do you describe the relationships between those?

Sarven: How does the shapetree work through HTTP resources where the target of a request is a resource. It is a document with a body... How does shapetree work in context of a resource targeted?

The chain of how information is preserved (host a medical image XRay is an ldp resource is this shapetree the shapetree has resources to other resources)

## Actions

* Elf to Accept suggestions and commit [PR 205](https://github.com/solid/authorization-panel/pull/205) - done