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It is possible for a malicious node to tamper with the DHT header of a message to make the message invalid. It can then forward this message. All receiving nodes will store the message body in the dedup cache and proceed to process the message. It will then discard it, rightly so.
But when the correct message arrives with the correct header the node will discard the message because the body is already in the dedup cache making it believe it already processed the message.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Description
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- construct the dedup hash correctly in SAF messages
- consolidate dedup hashing
- move dedup to after decryption/validation step in saf processor
Motivation and Context
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SAF db is also used for dedup, so the hash must match.
Closes#3419
How Has This Been Tested?
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Existing unit tests, memorynet and manually
It is possible for a malicious node to tamper with the DHT header of a message to make the message invalid. It can then forward this message. All receiving nodes will store the message body in the dedup cache and proceed to process the message. It will then discard it, rightly so.
But when the correct message arrives with the correct header the node will discard the message because the body is already in the dedup cache making it believe it already processed the message.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: