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Debug Message show fps allways 0 in fbtft_update_display #328

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Debug Message show fps allways 0 in fbtft_update_display #328

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@gdampf gdampf commented Sep 27, 2016

Switching on Debug=32 (DEBUG_TIME_EACH_UPDATE) shows allways 0 FPS. Compared to earlier Version shows, that the if statement in 394 has been negated and the assigment in 397 (par->update_time = ts_start;) has to be moved (now 408) after the usage in 398 (now 397). Now the value of fps is correctly calculated.

@gdampf
Debug Message show fps allways 0 in fbtft_update_display
0f93ce6 
Switching on Debug=32 (DEBUG_TIME_EACH_UPDATE) shows allways 0 FPS. Compared to earlier Version shows, that the if statement in 394 has been negated and the assigment in 397 (par->update_time = ts_start;) has to be moved (now 408) after the usage in 398 (now 397). Now the value of fps is correctly calculated.
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 18, 2020
@morimoto @intel-lab-lkp
ASoC: soc-core: use client_mutex for snd_soc_find_dai()
39e4bfe 
commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of these background, we will get WARNING if .config has CONFIG_LOCKDEP.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

Many drivers are already calling snd_soc_find_dai() and/or snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
Thus, same thing can be happen on these drivers, too.

	> grep snd_soc_find_dai -rl sound/soc/*
	sound/soc/samsung/tm2_wm5110.c
	sound/soc/soc-core.c
	sound/soc/soc-dai.c
	sound/soc/soc-topology.c
	sound/soc/sof/topology.c

	> grep snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities -rl sound/soc/*
	sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c
	sound/soc/generic/audio-graph-card.c
	sound/soc/qcom/common.c
	sound/soc/soc-dai.c

This patch renames current snd_soc_find_dai() to _no_mutex(),
and new snd_soc_find_dai() uses client_mutex.

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 18, 2020
@morimoto @intel-lab-lkp
ASoC: soc-core: move snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() to soc-core.c
c2b7a78 
commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of this, we will get WARNING.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

Because not only snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() but many drivers
are already using snd_soc_find_dai(),
1st idea for this issue was creating snd_soc_find_dai() of
_with_mutex / _without_mutex, but it was not enough and/or confusable.

soc-dai.c which is implemented snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() currently is
mainly for snd_soc_dai related functions, not for snd_soc_dai_link.
Thus as 2nd idea, this patch moves snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities()
from soc-dai.c to soc-core.c, and use mutex_lock().

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 27, 2020
@morimoto @intel-lab-lkp
ASoC: soc-core: add snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex()
41b84e9 
commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of these background, we will get WARNING if .config has CONFIG_LOCKDEP.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

snd_soc_find_dai() will be used from (X) CPU/Codec/Platform driver with
mutex lock, and (Y) Card driver without mutex lock.
This snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() is for Card driver,
this means called without mutex.
This patch adds snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex() to solve it.

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
morimoto added a commit to morimoto/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 27, 2020
@morimoto
ASoC: soc-core: move snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() to soc-core.c
d4a9cf1 
commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of this, we will get WARNING.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

soc-dai.c which is implemented snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() currently is
mainly for snd_soc_dai related functions, not for snd_soc_dai_link.
This patch moves snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() from soc-dai.c to soc-core.c
and use mutex_lock().

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
morimoto added a commit to morimoto/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 27, 2020
@morimoto
ASoC: soc-core: add snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex()
cccf630 
commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of these background, we will get WARNING if .config has CONFIG_LOCKDEP.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

snd_soc_find_dai() will be used from (X) CPU/Codec/Platform driver with
mutex lock, and (Y) Card driver without mutex lock.
This snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() is for Card driver,
this means called without mutex.
This patch adds snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex() to solve it.

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
plbossart pushed a commit to plbossart/sound that referenced this pull request Aug 27, 2020
@morimoto @broonie
ASoC: soc-core: add snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex()
c1c277b 
commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of these background, we will get WARNING if .config has CONFIG_LOCKDEP.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

snd_soc_find_dai() will be used from (X) CPU/Codec/Platform driver with
mutex lock, and (Y) Card driver without mutex lock.
This snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() is for Card driver,
this means called without mutex.
This patch adds snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex() to solve it.

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87blixvuab.wl-kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 28, 2020
@morimoto @broonie
ASoC: soc-core: add snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex()
20d9fde 
commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of these background, we will get WARNING if .config has CONFIG_LOCKDEP.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

snd_soc_find_dai() will be used from (X) CPU/Codec/Platform driver with
mutex lock, and (Y) Card driver without mutex lock.
This snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() is for Card driver,
this means called without mutex.
This patch adds snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex() to solve it.

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87blixvuab.wl-kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
jackpot51 referenced this pull request in pop-os/linux Oct 19, 2020
@morimoto @piso77
ASoC: soc-core: add snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex()
c9af2e9 
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1896795

[ Upstream commit 20d9fde ]

commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of these background, we will get WARNING if .config has CONFIG_LOCKDEP.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ #328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

snd_soc_find_dai() will be used from (X) CPU/Codec/Platform driver with
mutex lock, and (Y) Card driver without mutex lock.
This snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() is for Card driver,
this means called without mutex.
This patch adds snd_soc_find_dai_with_mutex() to solve it.

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87blixvuab.wl-kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 12, 2021
@intel-lab-lkp
staging: rtl8723bs: remove typedefs in HalBtcOutSrc.h
2c3189b 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl warnings:

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#47: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:47:
    +typedef enum _BTC_POWERSAVE_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#54: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:54:
    +typedef enum _BTC_BT_REG_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#63: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:63:
    +typedef enum _BTC_CHIP_INTERFACE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#71: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:71:
    +typedef enum _BTC_CHIP_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#81: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:81:
    +typedef enum _BTC_MSG_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#167: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:167:
    +typedef struct _BTC_BOARD_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#177: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:177:
    +typedef enum _BTC_DBG_OPCODE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#187: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:187:
    +typedef enum _BTC_RSSI_STATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#200: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:200:
    +typedef enum _BTC_WIFI_ROLE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#208: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:208:
    +typedef enum _BTC_WIFI_BW_MODE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#215: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:215:
    +typedef enum _BTC_WIFI_TRAFFIC_DIR {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#221: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:221:
    +typedef enum _BTC_WIFI_PNP {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#228: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:228:
    +typedef enum _BT_WIFI_COEX_STATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#239: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:239:
    +typedef enum _BTC_GET_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#281: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:281:
    +typedef enum _BTC_SET_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#321: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:321:
    +typedef enum _BTC_DBG_DISP_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#328: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:328:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_IPS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#334: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:334:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_LPS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#340: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:340:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_SCAN {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#346: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:346:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_ASSOCIATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#352: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:352:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_MEDIA_STATUS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#358: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:358:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_SPECIAL_PACKET {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#366: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:366:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_STACK_OPERATION {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#374: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:374:
    +typedef enum _BTC_ANTENNA_POS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#412: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:412:
    +typedef struct _BTC_BT_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#440: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:440:
    +typedef struct _BTC_STACK_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#455: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:455:
    +typedef struct _BTC_BT_LINK_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#468: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:468:
    +typedef struct _BTC_STATISTICS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#487: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:487:
    +typedef struct _BTC_COEXIST {

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marco.cesati@gmail.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 12, 2021
@intel-lab-lkp
staging: rtl8723bs: remove typedefs in odm.h
3b7b1fb 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl warnings:

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#95: FILE: hal/odm.h:95:
    +typedef struct _Rate_Adaptive_Table_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#99: FILE: hal/odm.h:99:
    +typedef struct _RX_High_Power_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#129: FILE: hal/odm.h:129:
    +typedef struct _SW_Antenna_Switch_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#181: FILE: hal/odm.h:181:
    +typedef struct _ODM_RATE_ADAPTIVE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#280: FILE: hal/odm.h:280:
    +typedef enum tag_Dynamic_ODM_Support_Ability_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#300: FILE: hal/odm.h:300:
    +typedef struct _ODM_STA_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#328: FILE: hal/odm.h:328:
    +typedef enum _ODM_Common_Info_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#418: FILE: hal/odm.h:418:
    +typedef enum _ODM_Support_Ability_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#449: FILE: hal/odm.h:449:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Support_Interface_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#455: FILE: hal/odm.h:455:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Support_IC_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#460: FILE: hal/odm.h:460:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Cut_Version_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#475: FILE: hal/odm.h:475:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Fab_Version_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#484: FILE: hal/odm.h:484:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_RF_Path_Bit_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#495: FILE: hal/odm.h:495:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_RF_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#516: FILE: hal/odm.h:516:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_MAC_PHY_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#522: FILE: hal/odm.h:522:
    +typedef enum tag_BT_Coexist_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#530: FILE: hal/odm.h:530:
    +typedef enum tag_Operation_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#543: FILE: hal/odm.h:543:
    +typedef enum tag_Wireless_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#555: FILE: hal/odm.h:555:
    +typedef enum tag_Band_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#563: FILE: hal/odm.h:563:
    +typedef enum tag_Secondary_Channel_Offset_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#570: FILE: hal/odm.h:570:
    +typedef enum tag_Security_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#582: FILE: hal/odm.h:582:
    +typedef enum tag_Bandwidth_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#593: FILE: hal/odm.h:593:
    +typedef enum tag_Board_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#605: FILE: hal/odm.h:605:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Package_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#612: FILE: hal/odm.h:612:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_GPA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#617: FILE: hal/odm.h:617:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_APA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#622: FILE: hal/odm.h:622:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_GLNA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#629: FILE: hal/odm.h:629:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_ALNA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#637: FILE: hal/odm.h:637:
    +typedef enum tag_CCA_Path {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#643: FILE: hal/odm.h:643:
    +typedef struct _ODM_RA_Info_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#675: FILE: hal/odm.h:675:
    +typedef struct _IQK_MATRIX_REGS_SETTING {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#683: FILE: hal/odm.h:683:
    +typedef struct ODM_RF_Calibration_Structure {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #788: FILE: hal/odm.h:788:
    +typedef struct _FAST_ANTENNA_TRAINNING_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#828: FILE: hal/odm.h:828:
    +typedef enum _FAT_STATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#833: FILE: hal/odm.h:833:
    +typedef enum _ANT_DIV_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#843: FILE: hal/odm.h:843:
    +typedef struct _ODM_PATH_DIVERSITY_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#852: FILE: hal/odm.h:852:
    +typedef enum _BASEBAND_CONFIG_PHY_REG_PG_VALUE_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#860: FILE: hal/odm.h:860:
    +typedef struct _ANT_DETECTED_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#870: FILE: hal/odm.h:870:
    +typedef  struct DM_Out_Source_Dynamic_Mechanism_Structure {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1229: FILE: hal/odm.h:1229:
    + typedef enum _ODM_RF_CONTENT {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1236: FILE: hal/odm.h:1236:
    +typedef enum _ODM_BB_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1246: FILE: hal/odm.h:1246:
    +typedef enum _ODM_RF_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1251: FILE: hal/odm.h:1251:
    +typedef enum _ODM_FW_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1262: FILE: hal/odm.h:1262:
    +typedef enum _RT_STATUS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1319: FILE: hal/odm.h:1319:
    +typedef enum tag_1R_CCA_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1325: FILE: hal/odm.h:1325:
    +typedef enum tag_RF_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1334: FILE: hal/odm.h:1334:
    +typedef enum tag_SW_Antenna_Switch_Definition {

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marco.cesati@gmail.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 13, 2021
@gregkh
staging: rtl8723bs: remove typedefs in HalBtcOutSrc.h
29a91bc 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl warnings:

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#47: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:47:
    +typedef enum _BTC_POWERSAVE_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#54: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:54:
    +typedef enum _BTC_BT_REG_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#63: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:63:
    +typedef enum _BTC_CHIP_INTERFACE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#71: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:71:
    +typedef enum _BTC_CHIP_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#81: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:81:
    +typedef enum _BTC_MSG_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#167: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:167:
    +typedef struct _BTC_BOARD_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#177: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:177:
    +typedef enum _BTC_DBG_OPCODE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#187: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:187:
    +typedef enum _BTC_RSSI_STATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#200: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:200:
    +typedef enum _BTC_WIFI_ROLE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#208: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:208:
    +typedef enum _BTC_WIFI_BW_MODE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#215: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:215:
    +typedef enum _BTC_WIFI_TRAFFIC_DIR {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#221: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:221:
    +typedef enum _BTC_WIFI_PNP {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#228: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:228:
    +typedef enum _BT_WIFI_COEX_STATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#239: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:239:
    +typedef enum _BTC_GET_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#281: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:281:
    +typedef enum _BTC_SET_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#321: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:321:
    +typedef enum _BTC_DBG_DISP_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#328: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:328:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_IPS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#334: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:334:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_LPS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#340: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:340:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_SCAN {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#346: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:346:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_ASSOCIATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#352: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:352:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_MEDIA_STATUS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#358: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:358:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_SPECIAL_PACKET {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#366: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:366:
    +typedef enum _BTC_NOTIFY_TYPE_STACK_OPERATION {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#374: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:374:
    +typedef enum _BTC_ANTENNA_POS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#412: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:412:
    +typedef struct _BTC_BT_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#440: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:440:
    +typedef struct _BTC_STACK_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#455: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:455:
    +typedef struct _BTC_BT_LINK_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#468: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:468:
    +typedef struct _BTC_STATISTICS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#487: FILE: hal/HalBtcOutSrc.h:487:
    +typedef struct _BTC_COEXIST {

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marco.cesati@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312082638.25512-2-marco.cesati@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 13, 2021
@gregkh
staging: rtl8723bs: remove typedefs in odm.h
694a76b 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl warnings:

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#95: FILE: hal/odm.h:95:
    +typedef struct _Rate_Adaptive_Table_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#99: FILE: hal/odm.h:99:
    +typedef struct _RX_High_Power_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#129: FILE: hal/odm.h:129:
    +typedef struct _SW_Antenna_Switch_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#181: FILE: hal/odm.h:181:
    +typedef struct _ODM_RATE_ADAPTIVE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#280: FILE: hal/odm.h:280:
    +typedef enum tag_Dynamic_ODM_Support_Ability_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#300: FILE: hal/odm.h:300:
    +typedef struct _ODM_STA_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#328: FILE: hal/odm.h:328:
    +typedef enum _ODM_Common_Info_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#418: FILE: hal/odm.h:418:
    +typedef enum _ODM_Support_Ability_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#449: FILE: hal/odm.h:449:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Support_Interface_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#455: FILE: hal/odm.h:455:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Support_IC_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#460: FILE: hal/odm.h:460:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Cut_Version_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#475: FILE: hal/odm.h:475:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Fab_Version_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#484: FILE: hal/odm.h:484:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_RF_Path_Bit_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#495: FILE: hal/odm.h:495:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_RF_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#516: FILE: hal/odm.h:516:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_MAC_PHY_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#522: FILE: hal/odm.h:522:
    +typedef enum tag_BT_Coexist_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#530: FILE: hal/odm.h:530:
    +typedef enum tag_Operation_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#543: FILE: hal/odm.h:543:
    +typedef enum tag_Wireless_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#555: FILE: hal/odm.h:555:
    +typedef enum tag_Band_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#563: FILE: hal/odm.h:563:
    +typedef enum tag_Secondary_Channel_Offset_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#570: FILE: hal/odm.h:570:
    +typedef enum tag_Security_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#582: FILE: hal/odm.h:582:
    +typedef enum tag_Bandwidth_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#593: FILE: hal/odm.h:593:
    +typedef enum tag_Board_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#605: FILE: hal/odm.h:605:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Package_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#612: FILE: hal/odm.h:612:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_GPA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#617: FILE: hal/odm.h:617:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_APA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#622: FILE: hal/odm.h:622:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_GLNA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#629: FILE: hal/odm.h:629:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_ALNA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#637: FILE: hal/odm.h:637:
    +typedef enum tag_CCA_Path {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#643: FILE: hal/odm.h:643:
    +typedef struct _ODM_RA_Info_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#675: FILE: hal/odm.h:675:
    +typedef struct _IQK_MATRIX_REGS_SETTING {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#683: FILE: hal/odm.h:683:
    +typedef struct ODM_RF_Calibration_Structure {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #788: FILE: hal/odm.h:788:
    +typedef struct _FAST_ANTENNA_TRAINNING_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#828: FILE: hal/odm.h:828:
    +typedef enum _FAT_STATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#833: FILE: hal/odm.h:833:
    +typedef enum _ANT_DIV_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#843: FILE: hal/odm.h:843:
    +typedef struct _ODM_PATH_DIVERSITY_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#852: FILE: hal/odm.h:852:
    +typedef enum _BASEBAND_CONFIG_PHY_REG_PG_VALUE_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#860: FILE: hal/odm.h:860:
    +typedef struct _ANT_DETECTED_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#870: FILE: hal/odm.h:870:
    +typedef  struct DM_Out_Source_Dynamic_Mechanism_Structure {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1229: FILE: hal/odm.h:1229:
    + typedef enum _ODM_RF_CONTENT {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1236: FILE: hal/odm.h:1236:
    +typedef enum _ODM_BB_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1246: FILE: hal/odm.h:1246:
    +typedef enum _ODM_RF_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1251: FILE: hal/odm.h:1251:
    +typedef enum _ODM_FW_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1262: FILE: hal/odm.h:1262:
    +typedef enum _RT_STATUS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1319: FILE: hal/odm.h:1319:
    +typedef enum tag_1R_CCA_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1325: FILE: hal/odm.h:1325:
    +typedef enum tag_RF_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1334: FILE: hal/odm.h:1334:
    +typedef enum tag_SW_Antenna_Switch_Definition {

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marco.cesati@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312082638.25512-4-marco.cesati@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
morimoto added a commit to morimoto/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 5, 2021
@morimoto
ASoC: soc-core: move snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() to soc-core.c
e82f23d 
commit 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
added snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities().
But it is using snd_soc_find_dai() (A) which is required client_mutex (B).
And client_mutex is soc-core.c local.

	struct snd_soc_dai *snd_soc_find_dai(xxx)
	{
		...
(B)		lockdep_assert_held(&client_mutex);
		...
	}

	void snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities(xxx)
	{
		...
		for_each_pcm_streams(direction) {
			...
			for_each_link_cpus(dai_link, i, cpu) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(cpu);
				...
			}
			...
			for_each_link_codecs(dai_link, i, codec) {
(A)				dai = snd_soc_find_dai(codec);
				...
			}
		}
		...
	}

Because of this, we will get WARNING.

	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at sound/soc/soc-core.c:814 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
	Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT)
	Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
	pc : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	lr : snd_soc_find_dai+0xf4/0x100
	...
	Call trace:
	 snd_soc_find_dai+0xf8/0x100
	 snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities+0xa0/0x16c
	 graph_dai_link_of_dpcm+0x390/0x3c0
	 graph_for_each_link+0x134/0x200
	 graph_probe+0x144/0x230
	 platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
	 really_probe+0xe4/0x430
	 driver_probe_device+0x60/0xf4

soc-dai.c which is implemented snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() currently is
mainly for snd_soc_dai related functions, not for snd_soc_dai_link.
This patch moves snd_soc_dai_link_set_capabilities() from soc-dai.c to soc-core.c
and use mutex_lock().

Fixes: 2561247 ("ASoC: soc-dai: set dai_link dpcm_ flags with a helper")
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request May 19, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
653e5ac 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  We will simply loop to create block groups until we have
space_info->full set or no tickets.  Unfortunately if we aborted the
transaction then we will never allocate chunks and thus never get
->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by also checking if we have BTRFS_FS_STATE_TRANS_ABORTED set on
the fs_info and bail out accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request May 21, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
8cca570 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request May 25, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
d2a189c 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request May 26, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
d92bcec 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
8eb8657 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
1312df8 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
10b091c 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Jun 21, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
e5b4611 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
2401f51 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Jul 27, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
53c2786 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Jul 28, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
2a37fd5 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Jul 28, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
e6a67e7 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 11, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
26eb3ab 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 18, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
a27713a 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
232b0dd 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
pipcet pushed a commit to pipcet/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 1, 2021
@josefbacik @pipcet
fs/btrfs/space-info.c:
ea6e687 
#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Sep 13, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
cc64e01 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
0bd9add 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
a2943a3 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 9, 2021
@josefbacik @intel-lab-lkp
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
4d626ae 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 9, 2021
@josefbacik @intel-lab-lkp
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
dc05f0d 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
 kthread+0x118/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 11, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
b668d34 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 14, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
d5f9de6 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 18, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
c243cb7 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 25, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
1871904 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 25, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
197643e 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 25, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
5729d8c 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kdave pushed a commit to kdave/btrfs-devel that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2021
@josefbacik @kdave
btrfs: do not infinite loop in data reclaim if we aborted
0e24f6d 
Error injection stressing uncovered a busy loop in our data reclaim
loop.  There are two cases here, one where we loop creating block groups
until space_info->full is set, or in the main loop we will skip erroring
out any tickets if space_info->full == 0.  Unfortunately if we aborted
the transaction then we will never allocate chunks or reclaim any space
and thus never get ->full, and you'll see stack traces like this:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u4:4:139]
  CPU: 0 PID: 139 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc1+ torvalds#328
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_join_transaction+0x12/0x20
  RSP: 0018:ffffb2b780b77de0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: ffffb2b781863d58 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: ffff987952b57400 RDI: ffff987940aa3000
  RBP: ffff987954d55000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff98795539e8f0
  R10: 000000000000000f R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffffffffff
  R13: ffff987952b574c8 R14: ffff987952b57400 R15: 0000000000000008
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9879bbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f0703da4000 CR3: 0000000113398004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  Call Trace:
   flush_space+0x4a8/0x660
   btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x55/0x130
   process_one_work+0x1e9/0x380
   worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
   ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
   kthread+0x118/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by checking to see if we have a btrfs fs error in either of the
reclaim loops, and if so fail the tickets and bail.  In addition to
this, fix maybe_fail_all_tickets() to not try to grant tickets if we've
aborted, simply fail everything.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 13, 2022
@guoren83 @intel-lab-lkp
net: Fixup virtnet_set_affinity() cause cpumask warning
2b7b5c3 
Don't pass nr_bits-1 as arg1 for cpumask_next_wrap, which would
cause warning now.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at include/linux/cpumask.h:110 cpumask_next_wrap+0x5c/0x80
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.0.0-11659-ge7e38f6cce55-dirty torvalds#328
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
epc : cpumask_next_wrap+0x5c/0x80
 ra : virtnet_set_affinity+0x1ba/0x1fc
epc : ffffffff808992ca ra : ffffffff805d84ca sp : ff60000002327a50
 gp : ffffffff81602390 tp : ff600000023a0000 t0 : 5f74656e74726976
 t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 735f74656e747269 s0 : ff60000002327a90
 s1 : 0000000000000003 a0 : 0000000000000003 a1 : ffffffff816051c0
 a2 : 0000000000000004 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000
 a5 : 0000000000000004 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000000000
 s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : ffffffff816051c0 s4 : ffffffff8160224c
 s5 : 0000000000000004 s6 : 0000000000000004 s7 : 0000000000000000
 s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : ffffffff810aa398 s10: ffffffff80e97d20
 s11: 0000000000000004 t3 : ffffffff819acc97 t4 : ffffffff819acc97
 t5 : ffffffff819acc98 t6 : ff60000002327878
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[<ffffffff805d84ca>] virtnet_set_affinity+0x1ba/0x1fc
[<ffffffff805da7ac>] virtnet_probe+0x832/0xf1e
[<ffffffff804fe61c>] virtio_dev_probe+0x164/0x2de
[<ffffffff8054c4c4>] really_probe+0x82/0x224
[<ffffffff8054c6c0>] __driver_probe_device+0x5a/0xaa
[<ffffffff8054c73c>] driver_probe_device+0x2c/0xb8
[<ffffffff8054cd66>] __driver_attach+0x76/0x108
[<ffffffff8054a482>] bus_for_each_dev+0x52/0x9a
[<ffffffff8054be8c>] driver_attach+0x1a/0x28
[<ffffffff8054b996>] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x1c2
[<ffffffff8054d592>] driver_register+0x52/0x108
[<ffffffff804fe120>] register_virtio_driver+0x1c/0x2c
[<ffffffff80a29142>] virtio_net_driver_init+0x7a/0xb0
[<ffffffff80002854>] do_one_initcall+0x66/0x2e4
[<ffffffff80a01222>] kernel_init_freeable+0x28a/0x304
[<ffffffff808cb1be>] kernel_init+0x1e/0x110
[<ffffffff80003c4e>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x10
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 78e5a33 ("cpumask: fix checking valid cpu range")
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 14, 2022
@guoren83 @intel-lab-lkp
net: Fixup virtnet_set_affinity() cause cpumask warning
43cd630 
Don't pass nr_bits-1 as arg1 for cpumask_next_wrap, which would
cause warning now 78e5a33 ("cpumask: fix checking valid
cpu range").

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at include/linux/cpumask.h:110 cpumask_next_wrap+0x5c/0x80
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.0.0-11659-ge7e38f6cce55-dirty torvalds#328
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
epc : cpumask_next_wrap+0x5c/0x80
 ra : virtnet_set_affinity+0x1ba/0x1fc
epc : ffffffff808992ca ra : ffffffff805d84ca sp : ff60000002327a50
 gp : ffffffff81602390 tp : ff600000023a0000 t0 : 5f74656e74726976
 t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 735f74656e747269 s0 : ff60000002327a90
 s1 : 0000000000000003 a0 : 0000000000000003 a1 : ffffffff816051c0
 a2 : 0000000000000004 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000
 a5 : 0000000000000004 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000000000
 s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : ffffffff816051c0 s4 : ffffffff8160224c
 s5 : 0000000000000004 s6 : 0000000000000004 s7 : 0000000000000000
 s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : ffffffff810aa398 s10: ffffffff80e97d20
 s11: 0000000000000004 t3 : ffffffff819acc97 t4 : ffffffff819acc97
 t5 : ffffffff819acc98 t6 : ff60000002327878
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[<ffffffff805d84ca>] virtnet_set_affinity+0x1ba/0x1fc
[<ffffffff805da7ac>] virtnet_probe+0x832/0xf1e
[<ffffffff804fe61c>] virtio_dev_probe+0x164/0x2de
[<ffffffff8054c4c4>] really_probe+0x82/0x224
[<ffffffff8054c6c0>] __driver_probe_device+0x5a/0xaa
[<ffffffff8054c73c>] driver_probe_device+0x2c/0xb8
[<ffffffff8054cd66>] __driver_attach+0x76/0x108
[<ffffffff8054a482>] bus_for_each_dev+0x52/0x9a
[<ffffffff8054be8c>] driver_attach+0x1a/0x28
[<ffffffff8054b996>] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x1c2
[<ffffffff8054d592>] driver_register+0x52/0x108
[<ffffffff804fe120>] register_virtio_driver+0x1c/0x2c
[<ffffffff80a29142>] virtio_net_driver_init+0x7a/0xb0
[<ffffffff80002854>] do_one_initcall+0x66/0x2e4
[<ffffffff80a01222>] kernel_init_freeable+0x28a/0x304
[<ffffffff808cb1be>] kernel_init+0x1e/0x110
[<ffffffff80003c4e>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x10
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 2ca653d ("virtio_net: Stripe queue affinities across cores.")
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
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