Update 1.md

content/papers/1.md

@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ summary: "This paper investigates the optimal allocation of common-pool resource
 
 ##### Abstract
 
-Rising competition in the commons poses risks of resource depletion and congestion, yet it can lower markups and increase consumer welfare. Conversely, larger, longer-lived firms tend to internalize externalities but also restrict production and raise prices. To navigate these competing concerns, this paper develops a model of common-pool industry dynamics and applies it to the 19th-century American whaling industry. The findings suggest that the industry over-harvested whales in early periods, subsequently making production inefficient. A monopoly firm would have reduced harvesting more than a social planner who maximizes social welfare. The optimal Pigouvian tax that fully internalizes the shadow values of whaling could have achieved a socially efficient allocation.
+Rising competition in the commons poses risks of resource depletion and congestion, yet it can lower markups and increase consumer welfare. Conversely, larger, longer-lived firms tend to internalize externalities but also limit production and raise prices. To balance these competing concerns, this paper develops a model of common-pool industry dynamics and applies it to the 19th-century American whaling industry. The findings suggest that the industry over-harvested whales in the early periods, leading to inefficient production later on. A monopoly firm partially mitigates these inefficiencies, but it would reduce harvesting more than a social planner who maximizes social welfare. The optimal Pigouvian tax that fully internalizes the shadow values of whaling can achieve a socially efficient allocation.
 
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-##### Long run inefficiencies in the commons
+##### Long-run inefficiencies in the commons
 
 ![](/navigating-the-common-fig1.png)